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SUMMARY
Last year featured a high stakes battle between two mighty protagonists. On one side, allegedly representing the interests of all
Canadians, the federal government. On the other side, Bell, Rogers, and Telus. The issue at stake: What institutions should govern the
allocation of resources in the provision of wireless services? Should the outcomes — prices, quality, availability, and other terms of service
— be determined by the market? Or should the government intervene? The answer to these questions should depend on the extent of
competition and the ability of wireless providers to exercise inefficient market power — raise prices above their long run average cost
of providing services. Do Bell, Rogers, and Telus exercise substantial inefficient market power?
The accumulated wisdom of market economies is that state intervention inevitably is very costly, given asymmetries of information,
uncertainty, and political pressure. At the very least the onus on those demanding and proposing government action is to provide robust
evidence of the substantial exercise of inefficient market power. This paper is a contribution to the ongoing debate regarding the
existence and extent of market power in the provision of wireless services in Canada. 
The conventional wisdom that competition in wireless services was insufficient was challenged by our earlier School of Public Policy
paper.†† In that study we demonstrated that the Canadian wireless sector was sufficiently competitive. The evidentiary record we
developed was not consistent with a robust finding of a substantial exercise of inefficient market power; policy efforts to create and
sustain more competition were unlikely to be successful without ongoing subsidization; and to the extent those efforts were successful,
they would likely to lead to an inefficient allocation of scarce resources, with the benefits of additional competition less than its costs.
The federal government’s standard bearer in this debate has been the Competition Bureau. The Competition Bureau has made
submissions and commissioned expert evidence in regulatory proceedings that conclude that there is market power in the provision of
wireless services in Canada and there are substantial benefits to enhancing competition.
This follow-up paper is a critical assessment of the Competition Bureau’s submissions and the expert evidence on which it is based. We
remain unconvinced that market power is a problem in wireless services or that additional competition in wireless services is efficient.
As explained at length in this paper, the expert evidence prepared for the Competition Bureau on both points is simply insufficient to
warrant regulation and subsidization of competition. The evidence with respect to market power is inconsistent with substantiality and
it is not robust. The expert evidence does not address whether entry is efficient. Instead it provides only an estimate of the competitive
benefits of a fourth national entrant — not its costs — and it does not assess the financial viability of a fourth national competitor. The
assessment of the competitive benefits of entry are unreliable, attributable to both the methodologies used by the expert and the
assumptions required to implement its simulation methodology. The lack of fit between outcomes derived from the model and
calibrated parameters with observed values indicate that the concerns over the specification and assumptions in implementing the
model are well-founded. Its inaccuracies pre-entry cast considerable doubt on its use to accurately forecast the effect of a fourth
national entrant.
Given the absence of compelling evidence demonstrating the substantial exercise of inefficient market power, the evidence that more
than three carriers likely raises concerns regarding financial viability without ongoing subsidization, and the evidence that additional
entry is inefficient, one wonders how long the federal government and its agencies will continue the failed policy of attempting to
“enhance competition” in wireless markets. What will be the final cost to Canadians of an economically vacuous commitment to the
proposition that competition is measured by the number of competitors? 
† We are grateful to an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions.
†† J. Church and A. Wilkins, Wireless Competition in Canada: An Assessment, University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, SPP
Research Series, 6(27), September 2013.
INTRODUCTION
In September 2013, The School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary published Wireless
Competition in Canada: An Assessment by Jeffrey Church and Andrew Wilkins.1 This study
considered three issues: (i) the invalidity of some commonly used international comparisons,
and the superiority of output measures in assessing the relative international performance of
Canada’s wireless services; (ii) in any event, why these international comparisons could not, and
should not, be a basis for assessing competition in Canada’s wireless services, while developing
and applying more suitable measures for assessing the state of competition in wireless services;
and (iii) the sustainability and welfare implications of a fourth wireless carrier in Canada. The
relevant measures that reflect the technological characteristics of wireless did not, and do not,
suggest that competition in wireless services in Canada was, or is, insufficient. The evidence
does not suggest that there is an exercise of inefficient market power in the provision of wireless
services that would justify regulatory and policy initiatives to further competition. Efforts to
enhance competition, even without considering the burden of subsidization, are unlikely to be
efficient and to improve the welfare of Canadians. The costs of such efforts will likely be
greater than the benefits, with the result being that the value of goods and services produced by
Canada’s scarce resources will likely be reduced.
Moreover, the analysis indicated that it was very unlikely that a fourth carrier would be
profitable without ongoing subsidization. Indeed the analysis suggested a very different
equilibrium in Canada and the United States relative to much of the rest of the world: rather
than a low-price, low-quality, low-investment, low-usage outcome, the equilibrium in Canada is
characterized by higher revenues, higher quality, higher investment, and higher usage. Measures
to enhance price competition run the risk of ending this distinction in a way that is unlikely to
be in the interests of most Canadians. 
The federal government has not backed off its commitment from the summer of 2013 to
enhance wireless competition, with the oft-repeated objective of realizing “more choice, better
service and lower prices.”2 Its policy initiatives have granted preferential access to new
spectrum for entrants and capped roaming rates under which the entrants could use the facilities
of the incumbents to provide service.3
1 J. Church and A. Wilkins, Wireless Competition in Canada: An Assessment, University of Calgary, The School of
Public Policy, SPP Research Series, 6(27), September 2013. Available online at
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/wireless-competition-canada-assessment. This research paper extends and
develops at length our independently authored response to the comments of the Competition Bureau, which was
submitted as an appendix to a submission by Bell Canada at the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission (CRTC). See: J. Church and A. Wilkins, “Wireless Competition in Canada: Response to the Competition
Bureau,” submitted as Appendix 2 of “Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2013-685, Wholesale mobile roaming in
Canada — Unjust discrimination/undue preference — Reply Comments of The Companies,” 10 February 2014.
Available online at https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2073564. The Digital
Economy Program at The School of Public Policy is funded by telecommunication service providers in Canada. The
funders of the program do not have rights of approval with respect to its research activities and all research published
by The School of Public Policy, including our original paper and this current paper, are subject to independent, blind,
peer review. 
2 See for example: Industry Canada Press Release, “More Choice for Canadians Wireless Consumers,” 19 February
2014. Available online at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=816849. 
3 Details of the policy initiatives can be found in Section 2 infra.
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Fundamental to each and every one of these policy initiatives, and indeed the set aside in 2008
of AWS spectrum that subsidized the entry of Wind and Mobilicity nationally, as well as
Videotron in Quebec and Eastlink in Atlantic Canada, is the assessment that competition in
wireless is insufficient. However, if wireless services at retail are competitive, then there is no
justification for regulating roaming rates, mandating access to wholesale services, or restricting
access to spectrum by the incumbents. If wireless services are competitive, then attempts to
foster more competition are inefficient — the value created is less than the cost of subsidization
and the value of goods and services produced from Canadian’s scarce resources is reduced.4
The purpose of diagnosing market power is to assess whether there is a market failure that
warrants policy intervention. In assessing whether a policy intervention is optimal, two types of
errors are relevant, as are their relative probabilities and costs. The two errors are diagnosing
inefficient market power when in fact it is not present (a false positive) and a finding that there
is not inefficient market power when in fact there is (a false negative). 
The costs of these two errors are very different. The costs of an incorrect diagnosis of
inefficient market power include not only the institutional costs of the regulatory process, but
more fundamentally the losses in economic surplus (value of production) that result from a less
efficient allocation of resources that arises from the incentives created by regulation. A bias to
market outcomes is warranted given that regulatory interventions are particularly prone to
negative outcomes when the regulator is imperfectly informed, there is uncertainty, and the
regulator is influenced by political considerations (e.g., lobbying and rent seeking, which
themselves use real resources and often create inefficiencies). The costs of not intervening
when there is inefficient market power can be large as well, but markets have a tendency to be
self-correcting: the lure of monopoly profits provides incentives for entry.5
Based on the relative expected costs of imperfect markets and imperfect regulation, the
threshold for regulatory intervention should be set high. The decision to intervene must be
rigorously justified with a clear demonstration that the expected benefits of state and regulatory
intervention exceed expected costs. These considerations should be obvious to a government
whose policy instinct is to favour markets over regulation.6
It is not enough that there may be some evidence of inefficient market power. The evidence
must be compelling: to be compelling, the evidence must not only indicate a substantial and
durable inefficient exercise of market power, but that evidence must also be robust. An
indicator is robust if it is not fragile to changes in assumptions or data. The substantiality of the
evidence and its level of robustness are clearly related to the probability of an error: again
given the relative costs it is better to favour false negatives than false positives. The evidence
must indicate a substantial exercise of inefficient market power and substantiality must not
disappear with alternative assumptions.
4 If wireless services are sufficiently competitive, differences in roaming agreements might harm individual carriers,
but they are unlikely to harm Canadians that use wireless services. Indeed Canadians likely benefit if lower roaming
rates for Americans traveling in Canada result in lower rates for Canadians traveling in the U.S.
5 For a seminal overview of the tradeoffs associated with regulatory intervention in the face of uncertainty, see: F.
Easterbrook, (1984), “The Limits of Antitrust,” Texas Law Review, 63: 1-40.
6 The explanation for the government’s policy choice would appear to be rooted in the economics of public choice.
The government’s policies may be better explained by the hypothesis that it believes that it is creating and
transferring economic benefits to its core base of voters, rather than an understanding that it is making Canadians
better off in aggregate by addressing a market failure based on the exercise of market power.
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3Our study has been introduced as evidence in the CRTC’s undue discrimination proceeding and
in its wholesale wireless proceeding.7 The Competition Bureau has responded in both
proceedings, taking issue with our conclusion and methodology.8 In its submissions, the
Competition Bureau asserts that the provision of wireless services in Canada is characterized
by the exercise of market power and monopoly profits. Its initial dissension in the undue
discrimination proceeding was short and unsupported by expert economic evidence. Its
submission in the wholesale wireless proceeding is more fulsome and supported by an expert
report by the Brattle Group.9,10 Unfortunately, the Competition Bureau has fundamentally
mischaracterized and misunderstood both our methodology and our findings. 
In this report, we explain why our conclusions are robust to the Competition Bureau’s
submissions and the analysis of the Brattle Group: 
• Wireless services in Canada are not insufficiently competitive. They do not exhibit levels of
market power that suggest market failure.
• A fourth national entrant is unlikely to be viable without subsidization.
• Entry by a fourth national entry is not likely efficient. 
7
“Bell Response to CRTC File No. 8620-C12-201312082 — Request for Information — Wireless Roaming —
Responses,” 27 September 2013, available online at http://crtc.gc.ca/otf/eng/2013/8620/c12-201312082.htm, and
“Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2014-76, Review of wholesale mobile wireless services — Intervention of
Bell Mobility,” 15 May 2014, available online at
https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2132065.
8
“Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2013-685, Wholesale mobile wireless roaming in Canada — Unjust
discrimination/undue preference — Submission by the Commissioner of Competition,” 29 January 2014. Available
online at https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2067254. “Telecom Notice of
Consultation CRTC 2014-76, Review of wholesale mobile wireless services — Submission by the Commissioner of
Competition,” 15 May 2014. Available online at
https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2131726.
9 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2014-76 Submission. The Brattle Report filed with the Bureau’s submission is:
K. Hearle, G. McHenry, J. Reitzes, J. Verlinda, and C. Bazelon, Canadian Wireless Market Performance and the
Potential Effect of an Additional Nationwide Carrier, The Brattle Group, 12 May 2014. Available online at
https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2131727.
10 Several other interveners have highlighted the Competition Bureau’s criticisms of our study in the undue
discrimination and the wholesale wireless proceedings. For undue discrimination, see: “Telecom Notice of
Consultation CRTC 2013-685, Wholesale mobile wireless roaming in Canada — Unjust discrimination/undue
preference — Reply Comments of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC), Consumers’ Association of Canada
(CAC), National Pensioners Federation (NPF), & Council of Seniors [sic] Citizens [sic] Organizations of British
Columbia (COSCO)," 10 February 2014, at para. 23, available online at
https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2073876, and “Telecom Notice of
Consultation CRTC 2013-685, Wholesale mobile wireless roaming in Canada — Unjust discrimination/undue
preference — Reply Comments of Globalive Wireless Management Corp. (WIND Mobile),” 10 February 2014, at
para. 24, available online at https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2073501.
For wholesale wireless, see: “Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2014-76, Review of Wholesale Mobile Wireless
Services — Intervention of Canadian Network Operators Consortium Inc.,” 15 May 2014, at para. 40. Available
online at https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2132198.
In this report we address only the Competition Bureau’s analysis and conclusions with respect
to competition and market power in wireless services.11
The Brattle Report evidence does not support the Competition Bureau’s policy conclusion
because either (i) its results are not fundamentally different from ours; (ii) where its
conclusions do differ, its methodology is not sufficiently accurate or robust; or (iii) it fails to
address the key question, whether a fourth carrier is sustainable.
One of our indicators of inefficient market power is evidence of pricing above average cost.
Pricing above average cost implies economic profits: the rate of return exceeds the cost of
capital. We found that the pre-tax realized rate of return for Rogers’ investment in wireless was
sufficiently low that it was unlikely to substantially exceed its cost of capital. We found it
much more likely that it was less than Rogers’ cost of capital. 
11 We do not address the theory of raising rivals’ costs, which the Competition Bureau invokes to justify a finding of
undue discrimination and undue preference. For the Competition Bureau’s characterization of the differentials in
roaming rates — that higher rates for entrants are intended to raise their costs and reduce competition — to be
coherent, a prerequisite is market power in wireless services. If there is not market power, then the rationale for the
higher rates for entrants cannot be anti-competitive, but instead is likely consistent with efficiencies, such as lower
roaming rates for Canadians in the United States. Even if the different roaming rates are an example of price
discrimination, price discrimination is not necessarily an indicator of the inefficient exercise of market power. Price
discrimination is consistent with competition between multi-product firms with fixed or sunk common costs. Indeed
Baumol and Swanson argue that competition forces firms to price discriminate in order to break even and recover
their fixed or sunk common costs. They show that it does not identify inefficient market power, but instead
competition will result in prices above short-run marginal cost sufficient for the firm to break even. This corresponds
to the distinction we make between inefficient and efficient exercise of market power. See discussion infra. W.
Baumol and D. Swanson, (2003), “The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying
Defensible Criteria of Market Power,” Antitrust Law Journal, 70: 661-685. 
We also do not address the Competition Bureau’s suggested framework for evaluating market power in wholesale
services. If there is not market power at retail, then there is no economic justification for considering the incentives
and ability for the exercise of market power in the supply of inputs to its retail competitors. We note, however, that
the Competition Bureau seems not to recognize that its approach in the wholesale wireless proceeding differs from
the analysis it has traditionally applied to determining whether access should be mandated at wholesale to wired
telecommunication facilities. There is a notable absence in the Competition Bureau’s wireless submission of
preserving incentives for investment, the effect on competition of mandating access, and the value of investment
competition that are key considerations in its analysis of wired telecommunications markets. See: “Telecom Public
Notice CRTC 2006-14, Review of Regulatory Framework for Wholesale Services and Definition of Essential Service
— Evidence of the Commissioner of Competition,” 15 March 2007, available online at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/partvii/2006/8663/c12_200614439/737543.zip, “Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2006-14,
Review of Regulatory Framework for Wholesale Services and Definition of Essential Service — Supplemental
Material of the Commissioner of Competition,” 5 July 2007, available online at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/partvii/2006/8663/c12_200614439/784002.zip, and “Telecom Notice of Consultation
CRTC 2013-551, Review of wholesale services and associated policies — Second Submission by the Commissioner
of Competition,” 27 June 2014, available online at
https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2157481.
In its recent submission to the CRTC’s review of wholesale wireline services, the Competition Bureau notes the
existence of “vigorous” competition between two facilities-based providers and recommends the CRTC withdraw
mandated wholesale access to unbundled local loops for residential wireline services. See: Commissioner of
Competition, CRTC 2013-551 Second Submission, at para. 3 and para. 26. The rationale for why two facilities-based
competitors may produce vigorous competition in the provision of wireline services, while three facilities-based
competitors are suggestive of the exercise of market power in wireless services, is not explicitly addressed in the
Competition Bureau’s submissions. The answer would appear to be related to two differences: capacity constraints in
wireless and an assessment that co-ordinated conduct in wireless is more likely. In Section 5 below we observe that
co-ordinated conduct is not an issue in wireless and we note below that capacity constraints in wireless for the
incumbents are in part a function of the government’s spectrum policy that restricts spectrum availability for Bell,
Rogers, and Telus. Other industry observers have also noted the contrast in the Competition Bureau’s approach to
assessing competition in wireless versus wireline markets. See: M. Goldberg, “Opposing resale competition?”
Telecom Trends, 22 July 2014. Available online at http://mhgoldberg.com/blog/?p=7362.
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The Brattle Group adopts and extends our analysis of the examination of excess profitability as
an indicator of market power by: (i) extending the analysis to include Telus; (ii) looking at
Rogers’ returns post-tax; and (iii) comparing estimated rates of return to estimated costs of
capital to assess excessive profitability. The Brattle Group analysis confirms our findings:
excessive profit margins — the difference between the rate of return and the cost of capital —
are small, especially for relevant cases. Moreover, the small margins are not very robust:
• The small excessive profit margins depend upon projections of future cash flows: the
excess profit margins to date are typically negative. 
• The excess profit margins are based on realized returns and not expected returns. Realized
returns might well exceed the cost of capital if there is a significant probability of them
being small or negative. Prior to investment what is relevant is expected returns, not
realized returns. Realized returns can be very deceptive and must be interpreted very
carefully before they support a conclusion of excessive profitability. Expropriating or
eliminating realized returns may well reduce the incentive for investment even if returns are
competitive ex ante.12
• The cost of capital measures are based on estimates for the consolidated operations of
Rogers and Telus, not their wireless operations. These costs of capital are likely not
reflective of the appropriate cost of capital for initial wireless investments: they will be too
low, not reflecting the risk of investment in wireless prior to the mid-2000’s.
• Similarly, the Brattle Group assumes the average risk premium over the period 2000-2012
is appropriate for investments in wireless prior to 2000. It is very unlikely that the risk
premiums based on consolidated operations from 2000 to 2012 are sufficiently high to
reflect the risk of wireless investment prior to 2000.
• The costs of capital derived by the Brattle Group are particularly sensitive to the forecasts
for interest rates in the future. Assuming that the low interest period from 2010-2012 will
persist until, for instance, 2030, likely results in an understatement of the cost of capital. 
The Competition Bureau’s submissions emphasize the high levels of concentration in wireless
services as indicative of market power. However, the Competition Bureau does not appear to
recognize that wireless markets will inevitably be “concentrated,” because of their
technological characteristics. The question is not whether or not the market is concentrated, but
whether or not it is excessively concentrated. Concentration and some exercise of market
power should be expected, the issue is whether wireless markets are excessively concentrated
and support the exercise of inefficient market power. This requires an examination of other
indicators of inefficient market power. The evidence of the Brattle Group does not provide
robust evidence of substantial inefficient market power. Moreover, as our first study
demonstrates, concentration in Canadian wireless services is typically less than in Canada’s
international peers, consistent with concentration not being excessive in Canada.
12 The danger is that if realized returns above the cost of capital justify a policy response, but firms are not subsidized if
the cost of capital is greater than realized returns, then the fear of a policy response that penalizes successful
investment deters firms from investing. If the top of the return distribution is cut off by fear of a policy response,
then expected returns will be less and incentives for investment will be reduced.
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The Competition Bureau has also suggested that the co-ordinated exercise of market power
should be a concern. The co-ordinated exercise of market power occurs when firms collectively
determine prices that exceed those when firms act non-cooperatively and set prices to
unilaterally maximize their individual profits. There are a number of characteristics that more
convincingly suggest that co-ordination in wireless services is difficult. These include product
differentiation, non-price competition, the presence of regional firms, asymmetrical capabilities
to bundle, and market-share asymmetries. Non-price rivalry between the three incumbent firms
underscores the extent of competition and the absence of co-ordinated conduct. Extensive non-
price rivalry in capital expenditures, customer service, network quality, and advertising are
consistent with competition, not the co-ordinated exercise of market power. The extent of
active rivalry between the three national incumbent wireless providers and the absence of co-
ordinated conduct is consistent with (i) the substantial variability in the annual share of net
additions for each of the three major carriers and (ii) the instability of their market shares.
In our study we used an analysis of the benefits and costs of the 2008 AWS entrants to argue
that a fourth national carrier was likely inefficient. The benefits from entry — the increase in
wireless consumption from lower prices — was unlikely to be greater than the costs of that
entry — from reduced spectrum available to the incumbents and the capital costs of the
entrants. We also concluded, based on available evidence, that a fourth national entrant was
unlikely to be financially viable. The Competition Bureau’s assessment is considerably
different. Based on the evidence of the Brattle Group, the Competition Bureau’s conclusion is
that entry by a fourth national carrier may be efficient and will provide significant benefits to
consumers.13
The Brattle Group does not show that entry is efficient. To do so would require showing that
the social benefits of entry exceed the social costs of entry. Instead the Brattle Group provides
an estimate only of the competitive benefits of a fourth national entrant — not its costs. The
Brattle Report does not provide evidence to support the claim by the Competition Bureau that
entry might be efficient. Moreover, the Brattle Group does not assess the viability of a fourth
national competitor.
The methodology used by Brattle involves determining the competitive impact of entry by
using the results of an event study. The effect on the profits of the incumbents — Bell, Rogers,
and Telus — from entry of a fourth competitor is estimated based on the change in their
valuation in the stock market in response to news that Verizon was not going to enter. This
estimate is combined with a simulation model of the wireless sector to determine the effects on
prices, wireless adoption, and consumer benefit of entry by a fourth national carrier. The
consumer benefits of entry found by Brattle arise from two sources: (i) consumer adoption of a
product that they prefer over that offered by an existing provider; and (ii) lower prices from
increased competition. Of the $1 billion in consumer benefits, approximately eighty percent is
attributable to the increase in the choice set of consumers and switching to the entrant’s
product, and only approximately twenty percent is attributable to lower prices and increased
output from increased competition. 
13 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2014-76 Submission, at para. 51.”
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The benefits of entry determined by the Brattle Group are not reliable and, if anything, likely
overestimate the effect of entry. First, the results hinge on the validity of the event study and
the ability of stock markets to accurately forecast the effect of entry. It is well known that
while the response of share prices is usually — but not always — in the same direction as the
change in profits, the response is typically very imprecise. Hence using an event study to pin
down the effect of another entrant on competition is not a suitable basis on which to construct
a simulation model and expect that the results of the model will be accurate. 
Second, the specification of consumer preferences in the simulation model imposes very
restrictive substitution patterns on consumers that likely make it inappropriate for assessing the
effects of entry in wireless services. The specification imposes restrictions on cross-price
elasticities of demand and patterns of substitution that mean it is not useful when product
differentiation and patterns of substitution are likely to be asymmetrical, in particular when
some products are better substitutes than others. This shows up in two ways: (i) it will indicate
substitution from some products to others even though they are not very good substitutes and
(ii) it will underestimate substitution between products that are very close substitutes. Thus this
model is not likely to provide much insight on the price effects of additional entry.
The approach of the Brattle Group also has a tendency to overestimate the benefits to
consumers from entry when their choice set expands. It will predict substitution to the new
entrant’s variety and therefore find increased consumer value from consuming a more preferred
variety — even if such substitution would not happen because the existing variety and the new
entrant’s variety are not good substitutes. It will also assume a substantial increase in consumer
value from consuming a more preferred variety even if the new entrant’s variety is very similar
to an incumbent’s offering. This specification of preferences is therefore, a priori, not likely
suitable for assessing the benefits from additional choices to customers, especially when the
additional choice assumed is based on Verizon, since Verizon’s product offerings would likely
be very similar to those of Rogers, Bell, and Telus. 
The specification is also problematic since it assumes discrete choice (consumers select a
service provider) and in its implementation the Brattle Group assumes that the price paid by
each consumer is average revenue per user (ARPU). In reality consumers choose a service
provider and a plan from that service provider. The details of the plan selected by a subscriber
includes the price for usage (price per minute or megabyte) and subscribers choose their usage:
voice, text, and data consumption. ARPU is not a price, the choice made by consumers is not
discrete.
A key determinant of the outcome of the simulation is the elasticity of demand for wireless
services. The Brattle Group assumes provincial values. They also assume that provincial
elasticities of demand are based inversely on provincial average revenues per user. Their
justification is that differences in ARPU are based on differences in preferences. We think it
more likely that differences in ARPU across provinces arise from differences in income and
economic activity, not because Albertans have different preferences than residents of Quebec
for wireless internet access. The assumed values for the elasticity of demand are an important
determinant of the benefits from increased competition. The greater the elasticity of demand,
the greater the expected decrease in price and increase in penetration from a fourth national
entrant.
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The suitability of preference specifications and input assumptions used in simulation models
are typically assessed by comparing observed values with values derived from the model and
its calibrated parameters. This basic check is not done by the Brattle Group. The significant
differences between the derived and observed values for marginal cost and variable profits
imply that the Brattle model is not a very good representation of consumer preferences and
competition in wireless services in Canada. The Brattle Group’s analysis implies a total market
size for wireless subscribers in most provinces that exceeds its population. In addition there is
quite a wide variation across provinces in the extent to which the total market size exceeds the
population of a province. The larger the total market size, the greater the welfare gains
estimated and the larger the share of non-subscribers, leading to higher elasticities of demand
and, as a result, likely a bias to greater output and lower prices from further entry.
The modeling of competitive interaction adopted by the Brattle Group assumes that the source
of market power is only product differentiation. The evidence also suggests the importance of
understanding the impact of capacity constraints and network congestion on pricing dynamics.
The relaxation of capacity constraints by increasing spectrum available to Rogers, Bell, and
Telus is more likely to have a significant effect on prices than will entry. Hence the cost of
misallocation of spectrum includes not only the increased capital costs of the incumbents, but
also the potential for reduced price competition between existing firms.
Based on our analysis of the Competition Bureau’s submissions and the Brattle Report, our
assessment remains unchanged. The Canadian wireless sector is sufficiently competitive and
additional government or regulatory intervention to increase competition is not warranted. The
evidentiary record to date is not consistent with a robust finding of a substantial exercise of
inefficient market power; viability of a fourth entrant has not been established; and such entry
would likely lead to an inefficient allocation of scarce resources, with the social costs
exceeding the social benefits.
The next section provides a brief summary of the policies adopted by the government to
subsidize competitors and competition in wireless services in Canada. This is followed by a
summary of “Wireless Competition in Canada: An Assessment.” A subsequent section
considers the Competition Bureau Submissions and the Brattle Report’s assessment of
unilateral market power and the efficiency of entry. The final section assesses the potential for
the co-ordinated exercise of market power.
A SAMPLING OF RECENT POLICIES TO PROMOTE COMPETITION
The government has attempted to maintain and enhance competition through a number of
measures. In this section, the major initiatives are highlighted, providing evidence of the extent
of the government’s preoccupation with being active on this file, and complementing its
advertising blitz.14
14 L. Payton, “Cellphone industry targeted in Ottawa’s $9M ad campaign,” CBC News, 2 December 2013. Available
online at http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cellphone-industry-targeted-in-ottawa-s-9m-ad-campaign-1.2447812.
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• Providing entrants with preferential access to spectrum.
- In the recently completed 700 MHz spectrum auction, the government restricted the
amount of spectrum the three national incumbents could acquire. To promote
competition, the 700 MHz auction rules prevented Rogers, Bell and Telus from acquiring
more than one prime block each. Since there were four prime blocks, there was little
competition for the fourth block, which was acquired primarily by Videotron, Eastlink or,
in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, by the respective regional carrier, MTS and SaskTel. The
result was that Videotron, Eastlink, MTS, and SaskTel (as fourth players) paid fire-sale
prices for one of the prime blocks. The price was so low that, in the words of Videotron:
“Given the way the auction unfolded, Quebecor Media could not pass up the opportunity
to invest in licences of such great intrinsic value in the rest of Canada.”15 The price per
MHz-pop (the product of bandwidth and population of the area covered by the licence)
of spectrum acquired was $0.65 for Eastlink, $0.73 for SaskTel and MTS, $0.83 for
Videotron, $1.05 for Bell, $1.78 for Telus, and $4.32 for Rogers.16
- The upcoming 2500 MHz spectrum auction, scheduled to begin in April 2015, will
include spectrum-aggregation limits for bidders.17 A considerable quantity of spectrum
will be included in this auction: between 60 MHz (30+30 MHz paired) and 125 MHz
(50+50 MHz paired, 25 MHz unpaired) spectrum across Canada. However, prospective
bidders will be limited to holding a maximum of 40 MHz total spectrum in the 2500
MHz band in a licence area. For wireless providers who previously acquired licences in
this band (notably Bell, Rogers and SaskTel), this policy means that their ability to
acquire spectrum will be limited in some licence areas. The constraint on these bidders
will likely lead to lower auction prices for the remaining participants.
- Industry Canada has also signaled its intention to restrict access to spectrum in a recently
announced auction for AWS-3 spectrum (planned for March 2015, prior to the 2500 MHz
auction).18 As in the original AWS auction held in 2008, Industry Canada plans to set 
15 See: Quebecor News Release, “Industry Canada 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: Quebecor Media Acquires Seven
Operating Licences in Four Provinces at an Advantageous Price,” 19 February 2014. Available online at
http://www.quebecor.com/en/comm/industry-canada-700-mhz-spectrum-auction-quebecor-media-acquires-seven-
operating-licences-four-. 
16 See: Industry Canada, “700 MHz — Spectrum Auctions,” 19 February 2014. Available online at
http://agora.ic.gc.ca/ccaWinners_eng.cfm?p_auction_id=8.0. The premium paid by Rogers (over four times the price
per MHz-pop paid by Bell) is a result of its desire to obtain two contiguous blocks of paired spectrum across almost
all of Canada. The other bidders won different licences in different service areas, making offering service and
entering into sharing arrangements potentially more challenging. By winning both block B (a prime block) and block
A (a non-prime block that may suffer from some technical interference issues), Rogers hopes to realize the speed and
capacity benefits associated with having a larger contiguous block of spectrum. The spectrum cap meant that Rogers
could not acquire two prime blocks, let alone two contiguous prime blocks. Rogers instead opted for the next best
alternative, blocks A and B. Following its recent NHL hockey exclusivity agreement, Rogers plans to use this
spectrum to bolster its mobile NHL video service. See: Rogers News Release, “NHL fans to benefit from 700 MHz
spectrum auction,” 3 April 2014. Available online at http://about.rogers.com/About/Media_Relations/News/14-04-
03/NHL_fans_to_benefit_from_700MHz_spectrum_auction.aspx.
17 Industry Canada, “Licensing Framework for Broadband Radio Service (BRS) — 2500 MHz Band,” January 2013.
Available online at 
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/vwapj/2500-decisionBRS-2013.pdf/$file/2500-decisionBRS-2013.pdf. 
18 Industry Canada, “Consultation on the Technical, Policy and Licensing Framework for Advanced Wireless Services
in the Bands 1755-1780 MHz and 2155-2180 MHz (AWS-3),” July 2014. Available online at
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/vwapj/SLPB-004-14-AWS-3-EN.pdf/$file/SLPB-004-14-AWS-3-EN.pdf.
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aside spectrum such that only certain auction participants are permitted to bid. While in
the 2008 auction Industry Canada set aside 44 per cent of the original AWS spectrum
(20+20 MHz of a total 45+45 MHz of paired spectrum) for “new entrants,” the AWS-3
consultation calls for 60 per cent of the spectrum (15+15 MHz of a total 25+25 MHz of
paired spectrum) to be reserved only for “operating new entrants.” To be eligible to bid
on the AWS-3 set-aside spectrum, these operating new entrants must currently provide
mobile services to the general public, have less than 20 per cent provincial wireless
subscriber market share, and cover a specified minimum per centage of the population in
the relevant service area,19 as well as having less than 10 per cent national wireless
subscriber market share.20 These restrictions effectively limit possible bidders to WIND,
Mobilicity, Videotron and Eastlink in their respective operating territories. As a result,
there will likely be minimal bidding competition for the set-aside spectrum, potentially
resulting in spectrum being licenced at reservation prices and, at the very least and most
obviously, there will be a transfer from Canadian taxpayers — as owners of the spectrum
— to shareholders of these firms.21
19 Industry Canada proposes to auction the AWS-3 at the “Tier 2” level, which largely corresponds to provincial
boundaries. To be eligible to bid on the set-aside spectrum, a new entrant must meet minimum population coverage
levels in the relevant area, ranging from 10 per cent for the Yukon and Northwest Territories service area, to 25 per
cent for service areas such as Alberta, British Columbia, Southern Ontario and Eastern Quebec.
20 Note that for the 2008 AWS Auction, Industry Canada defined a new entrant as an entity holding less than 10 per
cent of the national wireless market based on revenue. This had the effect of allowing SaskTel and MTS, each with
more than 50 per cent wireless subscriber market share in their respective provinces, to bid on the set-aside spectrum.
Industry Canada, “Policy Framework for the Auction for Spectrum Licences for Advanced Wireless Services and
other Spectrum in the 2 GHz Range,” November 2007. Available online at 
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/vwapj/awspolicy-e.pdf/$FILE/awspolicy-e.pdf.
21 By setting aside spectrum especially for operating new entrants in the upcoming AWS-3 spectrum auction, Industry
Canada has unilaterally boosted the value of these firms as potential conduits for acquiring large quantities of
inexpensive spectrum, likely a considerable amount relative to their value as wireless service providers. Indeed it is
not clear that Mobilicity and WIND have a future as wireless operators. 
Mobilicity is in bankruptcy without an obvious suitor, as the government has effectively browbeaten Telus into
dropping its third attempt to acquire the struggling entrant. Indeed, it was widely reported that if Telus persisted in its
attempts to acquire Mobilicity, Industry Canada would change the rules for the upcoming 2500 MHz auction to
exclude it (and other incumbents) from bidding. See: S. Chase, “Ottawa threatens to cut Telus out of wireless
auction,” The Globe and Mail, 25 April 2014. Available online at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/ottawa-threatens-to-cut-telus-out-of-wireless-auction/article18202648/. 
WIND is only now (nearly five years after launching services) close to breaking even on a cash-flow basis. A. Sharp,
“Canada’s Wind Mobile nears break-even, sees 2015 profit,” Reuters, 17 June 2014. Available online at
http://ca.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idCAKBN0ES2OE20140617. Furthermore, Wind’s multinational parent,
VimpelCom, has written down its stake to $0, refused to make any further expenditures, and reiterated its desire to
divest its Canadian division. See: C. Dobby, “Wind Mobile’s subscribers top 700,000, but VimpelCom still looking
for an exit,” Financial Post, 14 May 2014. Available online at http://business.financialpost.com/2014/05/14/wind-
mobiles-subscribers-top-700000-but-vimpelcom-still-looking-for-an-exit/. Indeed, VimpelCom has reportedly placed
a $300 million price tag on WIND, and Quebecor, as well as private equity firms, have been mulling making an
investment. See: C. Dobby, “Quebecor among potential buyers circling Wind,” The Globe and Mail, 31 July 2014.
Available online at 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/potential-buyers-circle-wind-mobile/article19881154/. However,
at least one potential buyer appears to have withdrawn because of concerns over the viability of WIND and it seems
that VimpelCom is reluctant to continue to cover WIND’s losses. See: B. Erman, “For potential Wind suitors,





• Maintaining preferential access by restricting transfers of spectrum. 
Industry Canada has made important changes to its policy regarding spectrum-licence
transfers since the 2008 auction. Initially, Industry Canada’s framework for the auction had
provisions that restricted new entrants from selling their licences to incumbents for five
years, but the implication was that — subject to the approval of the Minister — transfers
could occur after the five year period.22 After deciding not to launch service in Western
Canada using its AWS spectrum, Shaw entered into an option agreement to sell Rogers this
spectrum once Industry Canada’s moratorium ended in 2014.23 Rogers also reached an
option agreement with Quebecor, now heralded as a possible fourth national wireless
provider, to purchase the Quebec-based company’s set-aside AWS spectrum in the Greater
Toronto Area.24 Later, Industry Canada expressed misgivings about the Rogers-Shaw deal.25
When Telus reached an agreement to acquire Mobilicity in May 2013, Industry Canada
demonstrated its willingness to block spectrum transfers, even from financially constrained
firms that pose little existing competitive constraint, as a means of promoting competition.
In particular, then minister of industry Christian Paradis proclaimed that the government
“… will not approve this, or any other, transfer of set-aside spectrum to an incumbent ahead
of the five-year limit… I will not hesitate to use any and every tool at my disposal to
support greater competition in the market.”26
After quashing the first attempt by Telus to acquire Mobilicity, Industry Canada released a
new framework outlining how it would approach spectrum transfers in the future.27 Under
this framework, a broad array of factors will be considered in making Industry Canada’s
“determination” about whether or not to approve a spectrum transfer. These include changes
in spectrum-concentration levels, the utility and substitutability of the spectrum, and
impacts on existing and future competitors. Rather than providing clarity, arguably this
framework simply provides flexibility for whatever policy the government wants to pursue
at a given time.28
22
“While all licence transfers must be approved by the Minister, licences obtained through the set-aside may not be
transferred to companies that do not meet the criteria of a new entrant for a period of 5 years from the date of
issuance.” Industry Canada, Framework Relating to Transfers, Divisions and Subordinate Licensing of Spectrum
Licences for Commercial Mobile Spectrum, p. 6.
23 J. Sturgeon, “Rogers strikes $700M deal to buy Shaw’s wireless spectrum, Mountain Cablevision,” Financial Post,
14 January 2013. Available online at http://business.financialpost.com/2013/01/14/rogers-strikes-700m-deal-with-
shaw-to-buy-wirless-spectrum-mountain-cablevision/.
24 At the same time, Rogers and Quebecor entered into an LTE network-sharing agreement in Quebec. E. Rocha and A.
Sharp, “Rogers, Videotron extend reach with network-sharing deal,” Reuters, 30 May 2013. Available online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/30/us-quebecor-rogers-idUSBRE94T0IP20130530.
25 D. Ljunggren, “Paradis signals unease with Shaw’s planned sale of wireless spectrum to Rogers,” Financial Post, 15
April 2013. Available online at http://business.financialpost.com/2013/04/15/paradis-signals-unease-with-shaws-
planned-sale-of-wireless-spectrum-to-rogers/.
26 Industry Canada, “Harper Government Protecting Consumers and Increasing Competition in Canadian Wireless
Sector,” 4 June 2013. Available online at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=746949.
27 Industry Canada, “Framework Relating to Transfers, Divisions and Subordinate Licensing of Spectrum Licences for
Commercial Mobile Spectrum,” June 2013. Available online at 
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/vwapj/dgso-003-13-transfer.pdf/$file/dgso-003-13-transfer.pdf.
28 Indeed, Industry Canada candidly states that “[t]his framework complements other measures taken by the
Government of Canada to increase competition in the provision of wireless telecommunications services.” Industry
Canada, Framework Relating to Transfers, Divisions and Subordinate Licensing of Spectrum Licences for
Commercial Mobile Spectrum, p. 2.
• Wholesale roaming initiatives. 
Wholesale mobile wireless roaming arrangements are the contractual arrangements between
two wireless carriers that ensure a carrier without network facilities in a particular geographic
area can still provide service to its retail customers in that area by using the network of
another carrier. Wholesale roaming is particularly important for new entrants since it allows
them to provide service in areas where they have not yet — and may never — invest in their
own facilities. Wholesale roaming is mandated and governed by Industry Canada.29
- Mandatory roaming and tower-sharing provisions. These provisions were introduced by
Industry Canada in November 2008 in the conditions of licence for all licenced spectrum
deployed by wireless providers.30 Mandatory roaming obliges wireless providers to allow
rival providers to offer service over (or to “roam” on) their networks, whereas mandatory
tower sharing requires providers to allow rivals to gain access to existing towers and
sites. For both mandatory roaming and tower sharing, agreements must include
negotiated, commercially reasonable rates (where technically feasible), with a mandatory
arbitration process to resolve any disputes.
Mandatory roaming was originally designed to allow new entrants to offer service in
areas where they had not yet built their own network infrastructure.31 As such, mandatory
roaming was initially implemented as a temporary measure, lasting for five years within
a new entrant’s service area.32 Outside of their respective operating territories, both new
entrants and incumbents were eligible to request mandatory roaming, initially for a
period of 10 years. Later, in March 2013, the conditions of licence were revised such that
mandatory roaming was extended for the duration of the licence (effectively indefinitely)
for roaming both inside and outside of a provider’s service area.33 This has the effect of
repurposing a policy designed to provide coverage “while the licensee builds out its
network”34 into a possible permanent mode of offering service that does not require
building network facilities. Under the current conditions of licence, all wireless providers
are entitled to mandatory roaming and tower sharing, however the policy is clearly
designed to enhance the service offerings of new entrants, who have much less extensive
network coverage than the incumbents.
- Not one, but three regulatory initiatives by the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) on wholesale roaming. Despite wholesale 
29 Industry Canada, “Revised Frameworks for Mandatory Roaming and Antenna Tower and Site Sharing,” March 2013.
Available online at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/sf10546.html.
30 Industry Canada, “Conditions of Licence for Mandatory Roaming and Antenna Tower and Site Sharing and to
Prohibit Exclusive Site Arrangements,” Issue 2, March 2013. Available online at 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/sf09081.html.
31 Industry Canada, Policy Framework for the Auction for Spectrum Licences for Advanced Wireless Services and other
Spectrum in the 2 GHz Range, pp. 7-9. 
32 Industry Canada, Policy Framework for the Auction for Spectrum Licences for Advanced Wireless Services and other
Spectrum in the 2 GHz Range, p. 8. If a new entrant had won licences covering all of Canada in the 2008 auction, it
would have been considered a “national new entrant” and would have been eligible for a possible five-year “in
territory” roaming extension, subject to meeting Industry Canada rollout requirements.
33 See: Industry Canada, Revised Frameworks for Mandatory Roaming and Antenna Tower and Site Sharing, pp. 5-7.
34 Industry Canada, Policy Framework for the Auction for Spectrum Licences for Advanced Wireless Services and other
Spectrum in the 2 GHz Range, p. 8. 
12
roaming being mandated and governed by Industry Canada, the CRTC decided to launch
its own investigation into its provision.35 Its initial findings were that there were large
differences between the roaming rates and terms of service provided by the three
Canadian incumbents (Bell, Rogers, and Telus) to U.S. carriers and those provided to
other Canadian carriers.36 This set up a second regulatory proceeding where the CRTC
considered whether or not these differences are undue discrimination or unjust preference
and whether the CRTC should institute remedial measures.37 The third hearing is to
address whether wholesale mobile wireless services are sufficiently competitive and if
they are found by the CRTC not to be sufficiently competitive, what regulatory measures
are required.38 The wholesale wireless services to be considered include not just roaming,
but also: 
> tower and site sharing, under which wireless carriers gain access to rivals’ towers
and/or sites to install their network equipment, even though this is subject to
regulatory oversight by Industry Canada.39
> any other network elements or services of existing networks, not currently regulated
by Industry Canada, that competing retail providers of wireless services would like to
have mandated accessed to at regulated rates. For instance a branded reseller provides
service by “reselling” the services of an existing network. If resale is mandated, then a
reseller could purchase — at a regulated price — the wireless services offered by an
existing retail provider, which it would then rebrand and sell as its own, providing
only marketing, billing, and distribution.
- The federal government was not, however, willing to wait for the CRTC’s regulatory
processes. The government of Canada’s 2014 budget introduced additional policy
measures, notably limiting the amount a carrier can charge for domestic roaming services
compared to the average price it charges its own retail subscribers, as well as monetary
penalties for violating the terms of the Wireless Code.40
35 CRTC, “Request for information — Wireless Roaming, Staff Letter, File No. 8620-C12-201312082,” 30 August
2013. Available online at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/otf/eng/2013/8620/c12-201312082.htm.
36 The other Canadian carriers include the 2008 entrants.
37 CRTC, “Telecom Notice of Consultation, CRTC 2013-685 — Wholesale mobile wireless roaming in Canada —
Unjust discrimination/undue preference,” 12 December 2013. Available online at
http://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2013/2013-685.htm. The CRTC decision in this proceeding was recently released. See
CRTC, “Telecom Decision CRTC 2014-398, Wholesale mobile wireless roaming in Canada — Unjust
discrimination/undue preference,” 31 July 2014. Available online at 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2014/2014-398.htm. The CRTC determined that there were “clear instances of
unjust discrimination and undue preference” in the wholesale mobile wireless agreements that Rogers had negotiated
with certain new entrants. In particular, the exclusivity provisions contained in these agreements were found to be
inappropriate and are now prohibited in all wholesale agreements between Canadian carriers for service in Canada.
There is neither an analysis of competition in the retail market nor the effect exclusivity agreements have on
competition in the CRTC’s decision.
38 See: CRTC, “Telecom Notice of Consultation, CRTC 2014-76 — Review of wholesale mobile wireless services,” 20
February 2014. Available online at http://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2014/2014-76.htm.
39 Industry Canada, Revised Frameworks for Mandatory Roaming and Antenna Tower and Site Sharing.
40
“Budget 2014 — The Road to Balance: Creating Jobs and Opportunity,” Government of Canada, pp. 177-178.
Available online at http://www.budget.gc.ca/2014/docs/plan/pdf/budget2014-eng.pdf. Bill C-31, “An Act to
implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on February 11, 2014,” 19 June 2014 (Assented To),
at para 240. Available online at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6684616&Language=E&Mode=1&File=4.
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SUMMARY OF COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF WIRELESS SERVICES IN CANADA
Our earlier study considered the following three issues: (i) the use and validity of international
comparisons in assessing competition in Canadian wireless services; (ii) the application of
relevant measures for assessing competition in Canadian wireless services; and (iii) the
sustainability and welfare effects of additional entry.
International Comparisons
Our study noted that perceptions of a competition problem in wireless services in Canada
typically arise from incorrectly making a causal link from Canada’s high ARPU to its low
wireless penetration rate (mobile connections per capita).41 We demonstrate that Canada is not
an international outlier when it comes to price and penetration,42 and more importantly when it
comes to usage — consumption of wireless services — Canadians are avid consumers of data
services. In terms of smartphone data usage and smartphone adoption, Canada is a world
leader.43 With respect to wireless voice, Canada’s participation per capita on monthly plans and
minutes of voice per capita are similar to most of its peers.44
We found that Canada’s high ARPU is explained by Canadians’ high usage of wireless
telecommunication services, particularly of data.45 High data usage is attributable to world-
class wireless networks and advanced handset adoption, while the quality of Canadian
networks is attributable to high investment levels.46 In Canada (and the U.S.) it is important to
recognize that the evolution of wireless services is different than it is in much of the world.
Competition between networks has focused not just on price, but also on the quality of the
network — coverage, capacity, and speed — as well as handsets. The emphasis on quality
results in greater investment, higher demand, and higher usage. The greater demand and usage
results in higher revenues that support network investment and the cost of providing higher
quality. 
In any event, international comparisons of price and output are not reflective of competition or
market power. In assessing competition, what matters is how closely prices track costs in a
country. That, in turn, involves a comparison of prices and costs in a country, not a comparison
of prices between countries.47
41 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 5-7. Indeed, some commentators continue to highlight measures of
revenues and penetration in their analysis. See: “Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2013-685, Wholesale mobile
wireless roaming in Canada — Unjust discrimination/undue preference — Comments of the Public Interest
Advocacy Centre (PIAC), Consumers’ Association of Canada (CAC), National Pensioners Federation (NPF), &
Council of Seniors [sic] Citizens [sic] Organizations of British Columbia (COSCO),” 29 January 2014, para 15.
Available online at https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2067213.
42 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 8 and p. 15.
43 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 11-12.
44 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 10-11.
45 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 18.
46 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 18-19.
47 Unless network quality, costs, and demand — among other things — are the same across countries (i.e., an apples-to-





RELEVANT MEASURES OF COMPETITION FOLLOW FROM THE TECHNOLOGY OF PRODUCTION
The typical measures used by competition authorities as an indication of competition and
market power are (i) concentration (the number and size distribution of firms; in this case,
wireless service providers) and (ii) high margins.48 But in wireless services, as in other similar
network industries, these structural measures will not be very informative and will be prone to
errors of interpretation. It should be expected that both concentration and margins will be high
in the provision of wireless service. The issue is not whether they are high or whether service
providers will have market power, but whether they are “too high” and service providers will
be able to exercise inefficient market power.
The reason concentration will be high in the provision of wireless services follows from two
relevant features of the technology of wireless services: (i) high fixed and sunk capital costs;
and (ii) economies of scale and scope. The implications of these are that profitability requires
markups over short-run measures of cost — high gross margins — in order for firms to cover
their fixed and sunk network costs. The difference between revenues and avoidable costs in the
short run are known as quasi-rents, and for a firm to break even its quasi-rents must cover its
sunk fixed costs. If they do not, then the firm will exit in the long run. If there are too many
competitors, then the consequent downward pressure on prices will squeeze margins and quasi-
rents and, as a result, some or all competitors will not recover their fixed network costs. The
result will be firm exit and consolidation until margins are restored. The implication is that
there will be a natural upper limit on the number of wireless carriers. 
Economists typically define market power as the ability to profitably raise and maintain price
above marginal cost, the price that would prevail in perfectly competitive markets. However,
the definition used by economists is less useful for policy analysis, since many firms will be
able to exercise market power based on this definition but they will not be able to raise price
above average cost levels (i.e., earn greater than a competitive return). Indeed, if a firm’s
average cost declines as it expands output — so that marginal cost is less than average cost —
the firm must be able to profitably raise price above marginal cost in order to break even. If
there are economies of scale and scope that make marginal cost pricing unprofitable and
perfect competition impossible, then average cost pricing is a more useful definition of a
competitive outcome. It is difficult to argue that market power that enables prices to be raised
above marginal cost and thereby allows firms to break even is a market failure, justifying
policy intervention, since without it there would be no service or production provided. An
alternative, and equivalent approach, is to adopt the economic definition of market power and
distinguish between the inefficient and efficient exercise of market power. Only the exercise of
market power that raises the price above long-run average cost levels is inefficient and gives
rise to monopoly profits.
48 The margin here is the gross margin, the difference in theory between price and short-run marginal cost, which in
practice is usually the difference between price and short-run average variable costs.
The existence of a natural limit on the number of firms gives rise to several important
implications. First, if the natural limit is small, significant margins may be required and there
will only be relatively few effective suppliers. Second, entry above the natural limit will not be
sustainable. Third, the relevant measures of competition should reflect the natural limit, and
regulatory interventions to increase the number of competitors above the natural limit may be
inefficient — that is, they result in an allocation of resources that does not maximize their
value to society.
USEFUL MEASURES FOR ASSESSING COMPETITION IN WIRELESS SERVICES
There are two measures for assessing competition in industries characterized by extensive
economies of scale, scope, and size. The first is based on the key competition issue of whether
prices track long-run average costs — i.e., whether wireless providers make monopoly profits.
The second is whether the market is more concentrated than the natural limit or, equivalently,
margins are higher than necessary to avoid exit or consolidation. In this regard, international
comparisons of market structure and margins can be useful, in particular whether concentration
and margins in Canada are higher than in other countries. If margins or concentration in
Canada are noticeably higher than in other countries, then further investigation as to why and
what it means for the exercise of market power is warranted.
Internal Rate of Return
The technology characteristics of wireless services mean that the appropriate measure of
market power involves considering the net present value (NPV) of total cash flow generated
over the lifecycle of a wireless service provider’s investment. A necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for monopoly profit levels and market power is returns that are substantially above
the opportunity cost of capital over that lifecycle. 
An examination of the leading firm’s cash flow over the lifecycle of the wireless industry
suggests internal rates of return (IRR) well below the likely ex ante, pre-tax, cost of capital that
reflects the risk of its investments.49 Over the period 1986-2012, Rogers Wireless’ real, pre-tax,
realized internal rate of return was just under 10 per cent.50 This is not likely consistent with
the inefficient exercise of market power and monopoly profits. Indeed it is interesting to
observe now the concerns expressed by the financial community and informed observers over
the risk and low returns of Rogers’ investment in wireless 10 years ago.51 Those concerns are
substantiated by Rogers’ internal rate of return from 1986-2008: the real pre-tax realized rate
was 3.7 per cent.52 The data revolution launched by the iPhone in 2008 not only transformed  
49 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 24-27.
50 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 25.
51 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 26.
52 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 25. Consistent with the numbers in the text, margins over the period
2009-2012 are much higher than pre-2009. However, these higher margins do not reflect inefficient market power,
but quasi-rents required to compensate Rogers for its capital expenditures and losses in prior years. See Church and
Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 24.
16
the market, but also gave a glimmer of hope for competitive returns. Whether competitive or
monopoly returns will be realized clearly depends upon the future trajectory of cash flows. We
noted that if real cash flows were assumed to be $1 billion annually — their average over the
period 2010-2012 — then the realized pre-tax real IRR for Rogers would be 13.18 per cent.53
Our conclusion was that the realized rates of return, when adjusted to reflect their ex post
nature, were likely less than reasonable estimates of Rogers’s cost of capital, consistent with a
finding of competition and not consistent with a robust finding of market power justifying
intervention. For Rogers’ investment to pay off, its real cash flows after 2012 likely need to be
substantially larger than the average from 2010-2012.
Concentration and Margins
A second measure of the competitiveness of Canadian wireless markets is to compare
concentration and margins internationally with comparable peer countries. Our comparison
shows the following:54
• The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in Canada is similar to other countries; indeed,
only in the U.S. and Germany is it lower, and then only marginally so.55
• The two-firm concentration ratio in Canada and Germany is smaller than all other peer
countries.56
• The three-firm concentration ratio in most other countries is the same or greater than it is in
Canada. Only in the U.S. and Germany is the three-firm concentration ratio noticeably
lower than it is in Canada.
• The share of the leading firm in Canada is close to the smallest compared to that of leading
firms in peer countries, and is significantly less than it is in some countries, where the
leading firm’s share is 50 per cent or higher. 
• Cash-flow margins in Canada — the difference between earnings margins before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBIDTA) and capital expenditure as a share of
revenue (a measure of capital intensity) — are similar to those in many other countries.57
53 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, footnote 64, p. 26.
54 Note that the shares and concentration metrics are based on Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Wireless Matrix
subscriber values reported in the country-specific tables from the fourth quarter of 2012. To facilitate cross-country
comparisons, MVNO subscribers (where disaggregated counts are reported) are included in the corresponding
facilities-based provider’s subscriber counts. See: Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 29-30.
55 The HHI is the sum of squared market shares. See: J. Church and R. Ware, (2000), Industrial Organization: A
Strategic Approach, San Francisco: McGraw-Hill, Chapter 8 for discussion; or the U.S. Department of
Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Section 5.3, 19 August 2010, online at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. The HHI is related to the exercise of market power — as
measured by the difference between price and marginal cost — in the Cournot model of oligopolistic competition.
56 The N firm concentration ratio is the sum of the market shares of the N largest suppliers.
57 Based on average cash-flow margins from 2004-2012. See Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 30.
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The striking feature of the international data is how similar the market structure is across the
different markets.58 The exercise of market power in Canada might be suggested if the market
structure in Canada was more concentrated than it is elsewhere or margins were higher. This is
not the case. If anything, wireless services in Canada are more competitive than in many of its
peers based on these structural measures.
Sustainability and Efficiency of Another Competitor
The natural-limit analysis in our study suggests that viability of a fourth national competitor is
an issue. The push for consolidation back to the natural limit — which in most countries
appears to be three — is documented in our report.59 The experience in Canada and elsewhere
suggests the reality that three effective competitors is the long-run equilibrium. This implies 
58 The relationship between concentration and market size (e.g., available demand) depends on the relationship between
market size and “set-up” costs. When set-up costs are relatively large in relation to total demand, concentration will
tend to be similar even across markets of different size. The similarity in market structures across countries suggests
that the scope for entry is exhausted relatively quickly. Consistent with the large set-up costs involved in constructing
wireless networks, the number of competitors appears to be limited. The definitive framework for analyzing the
relationship between technology, market size and equilibrium market structure can be found in John Sutton, (1991),
Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising and the Evolution of Concentration, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
59 The presence of a fourth player typically results in unsustainably low prices and profit margins which ultimately lead
to consolidation. See: Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 31-35. Additional examples of potential
consolidation from four to three include the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. After AT&T’s failed attempt to
acquire T-Mobile in the U.S., the push for consolidation to three national carriers remains with Sprint making, and
then abandoning, an offer for T-Mobile. However, the forces in favour of consolidation remain given the financial
difficulties and loss in subscribers of Sprint in the U.S. See: S. Kim, M. Lopes, and Y. Shida, “Sprint drops bid to
buy T-Mobile, changes CEO,” Reuters, 6 August 2014. Available online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/06/sprint-corp-tmobile-idUSL2N0QB2WU20140806.
In France, there has been considerable upheaval in wireless markets. After entering as a fourth player in 2012, Free
Mobile/Illiad (whose parent also offers residential broadband, VOIP telephony, and IPTV services) offered “cutthroat
tariffs, forcing rivals to slash prices.” However, while some viewed this increase in competition as an achievement to
be emulated, it does not appear to be durable. The second-largest carrier, SFR, was sold recently to Numericable, a
French cable company, and there is speculation that consolidation between Free Mobile and Bouygues (the third-
largest carrier) is inevitable. See: “Vivendi’s SFR Call Widens Rift,” The Wall Street Journal, 6 April 2014 online at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303456104579485722491794180; and “Numericable gains
SFR. What now for Bouygues?” The Economist, 6 April 2014 online at
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/04/french-telecoms. 
In Germany, a merger between Telefonica and E-Plus reduced the number of carriers from four to three, with some
commentators viewing it as a template for consolidation in the fragmented European market that currently “leads to
price wars and poorer-quality service for consumers.” See: R. Bartunek and H. Ten Wolde, “EU clears Telefonica
Deutschland’s takeover of E-Plus,” Reuters, 2 July 2014. Indeed, there is also speculation about four-to-three mergers
in both Italy and Spain. The transaction in Italy is different from the four-to-three merger that was under discussion
and reported in our previous paper. See: G. Campbell, “Global Wireless Matrix 2Q14 — Consolidation: The art of
the possible,” Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 21 July 2014. The consolidation from four to three in Germany may
mean on a going forward basis that Germany’s HHI and three-firm concentration ratio are no longer less than
Canada’s.
Consistent with Canada’s experience with Microcell and Clearnet, Telus acquired Public Mobile in the fall of 2013.
Both Industry Canada and the Competition Bureau approved the transaction. Part of the reason was that Public
Mobile was going to discontinue a low price plan because of “financial sustainability issues”. The Bureau concluded
that the elimination of Public Mobile would not result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition because
of effective remaining competition. The Bureau believed that the remaining 2008 AWS entrants (WIND and
Mobilicity in Ontario, Videotron in Quebec) would “continue to provide effective competition post-transaction.” See:
“Competition Bureau Statement Regarding the Proposed Acquisition by TELUS of Public Mobile,” 29 November
2013. Available online at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03633.html.
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that sustaining more than three national competitors will require subsidization.60 A recent report
by Informa Telecoms & Media (a consultancy in the United Kingdom) notes that “A consensus
is emerging in the mobile communications industry that three is the optimum number of
mobile operators for any given market.”61
Entry by the 2008 AWS entrants appears to be an example of inefficient entry. The extent of
the benefits from entry by the 2008 AWS entrants appears to have been very limited, given the
small increase in output in terms of minutes, penetration, and data usage.62 Moreover, entry
seems to have had very little effect on prices actually paid by Canadians.63 The fall in prices
for voice appears to be due to the commoditization of voice and competition between the
incumbents.64
The benefits from the 2008 AWS entrants were limited by the entrants’ narrow focus on voice
and text in a mature market. Given that their business plans focused on what they thought was
the market niche not well served by the incumbents — the low-price, prepaid segment — the
entrants were not constrained by spectrum.65 As discussed in our report, they were constrained
60 The acquisition by Quebecor of 700 MHz spectrum outside of Quebec is indicative of subsidization. See the
discussion above regarding the fire-sale price paid by Quebecor for this spectrum. Quebecor’s lack of commitment
with respect to actually entering and providing service, especially given its optioning of its AWS spectrum to Rogers
in Toronto, its lack of wireline infrastructure outside of Quebec, and the low spectrum acquisition price, means that
Quebecor’s acquisition may be in part a bet that government policy will change in the future and it will be able to
profitably sell its 700 MHz spectrum outside of Quebec. To build a national network, Quebecor would have to make
very large capital expenditures and would likely require partners to help share the financial burden. Dvai Ghose, an
analyst with Canaccord Genuity, neatly summarizes Quebecor’s challenges: “Given the amount of capital that we
assume is required, we fear that Videotron would be diluted to a very small ownership in a hypothetical (joint
venture) if it just contributed its spectrum. Then again this may be better than investing and destroying capital. We
are left wondering why a partner would only partner outside Quebec, where Videotron has no obvious competitive
advantages.” See: G. O’Brien, “Much still to be done to remove risk, attract investment, if Quebecor is to go national
with wireless, say execs,” CARTT, 31 July 2014. Available online at
https://cartt.ca/article/much-still-be-done-remove-risk-attract-investment-if-quebecor-go-national-wireless-say-execs.
Another analyst noted that “Quebecor is also likely seeking regulations that would ensure domestic wholesale
roaming rates for data less than one cent per megabyte, better rules to ensure access to towers, successfully
negotiating a combined entity involving Wind Mobile and Mobilicity, access to unused spectrum held by Shaw
Communications Inc., and an immediate cash investment of about $1.3 billion from Quebecor and investment
partners. See “Government ‘determined to get that fourth national carrier’,” The Wire Report, 7 July 2014. Available
online at http://www.thewirereport.ca/news/2014/07/07/aws-3-spectrum-coming-available-next-year/28504.
61 M. Newman, “Informa Telecoms & Media’s Top Predictions for 2014,” Press Release, 20 January 2014. Available
online at http://blogs.informatandm.com/19202/press-release-informa-telecoms-medias-top-predictions-for-2014/.
62 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 37-40. The comparatively low HHI value for Canada, even relative to
other countries with four players, suggests that the “fourth player” in those countries typically has a marginal effect
on competition.
63 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 41-42.
64 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 43-44.
65 See, for example: Lemay-Yates Associates, The Impact of 700 MHz Spectrum on LTE Deployment and Broadband in
Canada, 28 February 2011. Available online at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/vwapj/smse-018-10-lemay-
submission.pdf/$FILE/smse-018-10-lemay-submission.pdf. 
Indeed, as noted in Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2013-685, footnote 6, incumbents providers control 85 per
cent of spectrum, however they provide service to 90 per cent of subscribers (as of 2012). See CRTC,
Communications Monitoring Report September 2013, Figure 5.5.4. Available online at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/policymonitoring/2013/cmr2013.pdf. On the business plans and focus
of the entrants, see: Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 43.
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by the fact that Canadians had very little interest in low-priced, prepaid plans.66 Instead of
allocating AWS spectrum to the incumbents, who would use it to increase the speed and
capacity of their data networks, it has instead been allocated to entrants who have focused on
voice and text. As a result, Canadians ended up with an incorrect mix of networks (e.g., at least
three additional networks with a focus on voice and text) and an inefficient allocation of
spectrum (too little to the three incumbents to meet rising demand for data transmission). 
The costs to Canadians from this misallocation are twofold. First, the incumbents have higher
costs, as they are forced to substitute capital investment in the form of more cells (requiring
more towers) for spectrum. Second, it is likely that the market power of the incumbents is a
function of congestion on their networks. As their capacity constraints are relaxed, their ability
and incentive to exercise market power is reduced. Firms that are not capacity constrained
typically have incentives to price more aggressively than if they have capacity constraints. The
incentive of a capacity constrained firm to lower its prices are reduced since an effective
capacity constraint means they cannot capture all of the increase in sales.67
In our view, the relaxation in capacity constraints associated with voice calls is a likely
explanation for the reduction in the price of voice documented in our study.68 The increased
spectrum available to the incumbents, capital investment, and adoption of LTE have also
increased the capacity of the incumbents’ data networks. Table 1 reflects the findings of the
2014 Wall Report and it indicates that prices rose 16.2 per cent for the low-usage basket, one
per cent for the average-usage basket, but fell by almost 15 per cent for the high-usage basket
over the period 2013-2014.69  The decline in the high-usage basket reflects a similar decline in
the average-usage basket over the period 2012-2013. Our observation on the price decreases
observed over the period 2012-2013 — that they reflect competition between the incumbents
— is likely even more relevant to the price decrease in the high-usage basket —with its data
component — over the period 2013-2014. 
66 See: Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 8 and pp. 37-40. Note that this suggests that the “higher prices at
the retail level” that the Competition Bureau alleges are the result of excessive wholesale roaming rates, even if true,
may not have changed the fate of the entrants, given their business model. Commissioner of Competition, CRTC
2013-685 Submission, para. 7.
67 S. Loertscher and L. Marx (2014), “An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of
Spectrum Licenses,” Review of Industrial Organization, forthcoming. Available online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-014-9427-y.
68 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 41-42.
69 See: Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 41-42, for our analysis of the Walls Report price data for the
period 2008-2013. Table 1 updates Table 8 in Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition. See: Wall Communications
Inc., Price Comparisons of Wireline, Wireless and Internet Services in Canada and with Foreign Jurisdictions 2014
Update, prepared for the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission and Industry Canada, at
Table A2.2. Available online at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/rp140714.pdf.
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TABLE 1: CANADIAN PRICE BASKET ANALYSIS (2008-2014)
Source: Wall Communications, Price Comparisons 2014 Update, Table A2.2
Level 1: Low-volume use, 150 minutes per month
Level 2: Average use, 450 minutes and 300 texts per month
Level 3: High-volume use, 1200 minutes, 300 texts and 1 GB of data per month
Population weighted average monthly prices for five Canadian cities.
In this regard, the government likes to trumpet that government policies are responsible for a
price decline of 22 per cent from 2008 to 2014.70 What should be clear from an examination of
the data is that this price decline is despite its efforts to create competition. The price impact of
the entrants should be reflected primarily in the low-usage basket, rather than the high-usage
basket.71 The Wall Report data make clear that this is not the case. The interesting question is
how much lower prices would be if the 2008 AWS spectrum had not been preferentially
allocated to the entrants.
Given that demand and adoption rates for the three different baskets are not the same, a
weighted average based on actual usage is a much better indicator of the change in price. For
instance, it seems reasonable to assume that users of the high-usage basket (that includes data)
have a smartphone and that subscribers of low-usage baskets are on prepaid plans. Using the
earliest available figures from Bank of America, smartphone adoption is 47 per cent at the end
of 2012 and the share of prepaid plans is 18 per cent. Assume that smartphone users subscribe to
the high-usage basket, prepaid subscribers to the low-usage basket, and the balance is comprised
of average users. Then the weighted average price in 2008 is $80.20 and in 2014 it is $59.87, a
decline of more than 25 per cent, a figure that reflects the relative importance of the high-usage
basket and its greater fall in price. The fall in price of the high-usage, data-centric plans,
underlines that the fall in prices likely has nothing to do with the 2008 AWS entrants.
The conclusion of the inefficiency of entry beyond the natural limit applies generally to
additional entry, not just the specifics of the 2008 AWS entrants. The experience of the 2008
AWS entrants does however clearly illustrate the potential for inefficient entry.
70 Industry Canada News Release, “Wireless Policies Working to Lower Prices for Canadian Families,” 14 July 2014.
Available online at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=867679. Industry Canada calculates the change in prices
in a curious way. It calculates the price decrease by considering the change in the simple average of the price of the
three baskets. This is not very informative since it does not reflect the relative importance of the different baskets.
71 See: Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 41-44 for discussion of the new entrants’ initial focus on low-
usage, prepaid voice and text services, and supra.
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Level 1 (CDN$) 32.73 33.03 34.03 33.73 34.32 30.71 35.70
YoY Percentage Change 0.9% 3.0% -0.9% 1.7% -10.5% 16.2%
Level 2 (CDN$) 60.81 57.78 53.49 50.51 51.31 44.86 45.26
YoY Percentage Change -5.0% -7.4% -5.6% 1.6% -12.6% 0.9%
Level 3 (CDN$) 112.34 103.24 109.59 99.69 98.37 93.59 79.69
YoY Percentage Change -8.1% 6.2% -9.0% -1.3% -4.9% -14.9%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
COMPETITION BUREAU CHALLENGE
The Competition Bureau submission challenges our earlier study on three grounds: (i) the
profitability analysis of Rogers Wireless; (ii) our use and interpretation of international
comparisons; and (iii) the inefficiency of entry.72 In support of its rebuttal, the Competition
Bureau commissioned a report by the Brattle Group.73 We address each of these challenges in
turn.
Monopoly or Competitive Returns?
Our analysis collected publicly available financial information for Rogers Wireless to create an
estimate of its annual free cash flow from 1986 to 2012. From this, we calculated estimates of
the internal rate of return for Rogers’ wireless operations. 
The Competition Bureau claims that our analysis is limited in that it:74
(1) examines only one service provider;
(2) does not actually measure that service provider’s cost of capital; and
(3) when properly interpreted, does not support our conclusions that market power is not an
issue in wireless services in Canada.
The Competition Bureau’s assessment of our report is informed by the Brattle Group Report
which contains an assessment of the profitability of wireless services in Canada.
Fundamentally, its logic is the same as ours, but it differs in three significant ways and is
presented as reaching a different conclusion. First, it calculates a pre-tax nominal IRR for
Telus’ wireless services.75 Second, it calculates a post-tax nominal IRR for Rogers. Third it
compares the IRR for the two companies’ wireless services to an estimate of the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) for Telus and Rogers (the companies as a whole, not their
wireless investments). The Brattle Group concludes that Telus and Rogers’ wireless business
“are generally earning above-normal returns on their investments, consistent with the exercise
of market power.”76
72 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2013-685 Submission, para. 11. Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2014-
76 Submission, para. 16-17.
73 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless.
74 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2013-685 Submission, para. 11.
75 We did not calculate an IRR for Telus. To do so requires a large number of assumptions. Those made by Brattle to do
so include: (i) using net book value in 1990 to value AGT’s investment before 1990 plus an additional $16.1 million
of other possible Capex; (ii) ignoring AGT’s EBIDTA from 1986 to 1990; (iii) assuming 25 per cent of the
acquisition costs of EdTel and QuebecTel are for wireless assets; (iv) estimating from net book value in 1988
investment by BC Telecom prior to 1988 and ignoring EBIDTA prior to 1988; (v) estimating EBITDA for BC
Telecom from 1988 to 1997; (vi) estimating wireless investment for BC Telecom from 1988 to 1990. See: The
Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless p. 21, and pp. 57-61 and “Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2014-76 —
Responses of the Commissioner of Competition to Interrogatories,” 7 July 2014, Table Bell-Q21, available online at
https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?Key=74312&Type=Notice. The validity of the
analysis depends on the accuracy of the assumptions, both individually and in aggregate.
76 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 1.
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THE ANALYSIS OF THE BRATTLE GROUP
Tables 2 and 3 show, for three time periods, our estimates of the pre-tax IRR for Rogers, the
Brattle estimate of the post-tax IRR for Rogers, the pre-tax IRR for Telus (lower- and upper-
bound estimates), Brattle’s estimates of the WACC for Telus (pre-tax) and Rogers (post-tax),
and our pre-tax estimate of Rogers’ WACC.77 The lower and upper bound for Telus’ IRR
depend on the difference in treatment of its acquisition of Clearnet in 2001. 
TABLE 2: ROGERS IRR AND WACC VALUES
Sources: Rogers pre-tax IRR values calculated using pre-tax cash flows from Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, Table A-5.
Rogers pre-tax WACC values calculated using after-tax WACC values from Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, Table A-7,
and, following the Brattle Group’s approach for Telus (Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p.63), “grossing up” these
values by multiplying by one less the statutory income tax rate values from Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless,
Table A-5. Rogers post-tax IRR values calculated using post-tax free cash flows from Brattle Group, Canadian
Wireless, Table A-5. Rogers post-tax WACC values from Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, Table A-7.
TABLE 3: TELUS IRR AND WACC VALUES
Source: Telus pre-tax Lower IRR values calculated using pre-tax free cash flow from Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless,
Table A-1. Telus pre-tax Upper IRR values calculated using pre-tax free cash flows from Brattle Group, Canadian
Wireless, Table A-2. Telus pre-tax WACC values from Table A-4.
Whether there are greater-than-competitive returns depends on whether the estimated IRR is
greater or less than the estimated WACC. In Tables 2 and 3 this comparison can be done for
four cases, for each of the three time periods, 1986 to 2008, 1986 to 2012, and 1986 to 2030
(the periods start in 1988 for Telus). Each time period provides a different perspective that
informs an assessment on whether inefficient market power is substantial and durable:
• The IRR to 2008 indicates low rates of return for services based only on voice and indicates
that to 2008 the evidence is inconsistent with market power and monopoly. The IRR is less
than the WACC for all four cases.
• The IRR to 2012 indicates the importance of the data revolution and its impact on the
return on capital in the wireless sector. The high demand realization for wireless services
was not evident in 1986, 1996, or even 2002. The explosion in data usage was a fortunate 
outcome that was likely not even knowable, let alone predictable when network investments
were originally taking place. The IRR to 2012 indicates that recent margins and free cash
flows are more consistent with competitive returns on network investments, than they are
with substantial and durable market power and monopoly profits. The IRR is less than the 
77 On an annual basis, this is the Brattle pre-tax estimate divided by one less the estimated tax rate. Following Brattle,
we calculate a weighted average WACC for the entire period using share of real investment as the annual weight.
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1986-2008 5.9% 15.8% -0.2% 9.4%
1986-2012 12.2% 14.6% 8.1% 9.0%
1986-2030 15.6% 12.2% 12.7% 8.1%
Rogers pre-tax IRR Rogers pre-tax WACC Rogers post-tax IRR Rogers post-tax WACC
1988-2008 -3.7% 8.0% 13.3%
1988-2012 6.8% 14.0% 12.8%
1988-2030 13.8% 17.9% 11.5%
Telus Lower pre-tax IRR Telus Upper pre-tax IRR Telus pre-tax WACC
WACC in three of the four cases; only in the upper-bound case for Telus is the IRR greater
than the WACC, and then only by 1.2 per cent.
• The IRR to 2030 indicates the importance of future returns for a finding of inefficient
market power. But what is astonishing is how small the extent of the excess returns are in
the three cases that are likely relevant: 3.4 per cent (Rogers pre-tax), 4.6 per cent (Rogers
post-tax), and 2.3 per cent (Telus lower bound).
The upper-bound estimate for Telus arises from treating Clearnet as if it was part of Telus.78 The
lower-bound estimate arises from deducting from Telus’ cash flow in 2001 the $6.6 billion paid
for Clearnet.79 The Brattle Group’s concern is that, in the acquisition of Clearnet, excessive
returns were capitalized. Brattle argues that of the $6.6 billion, most reflects capitalized
monopoly profits and the value of the 30 MHz PCS licence was relatively small.80 But this seems
to ignore that Clearnet’s national 30 MHz PCS licence did have scarcity value and that Clearnet
had 735,000 subscribers.81 Telus, pre-acquisition, had 35 MHz of spectrum in its operating areas
and approximately 1.2 million subscribers. Acquiring Clearnet was one, and maybe the only,
opportunity for Telus to become a national carrier.82 In any event, if approximately 65 per cent of
the $6.6 billion is the competitive value of Clearnet, then the IRR from 1988 to 2012 equals the
Brattle Group’s estimate of the WACC and is close to Rogers’ IRR. 
It seems dubious that Telus’ IRR should exceed that of Rogers.83 As discussed in our analysis,
“Rogers is the largest wireless incumbent in Canada and has been the market leader for some
time.”84 The average market share of Rogers over the period 2002-2012 was 36.4 per cent;
Bell’s was 31.1 per cent; and Telus’ 27.1 per cent.85 The monthly ARPU for Rogers has
averaged $60.72 since its acquisition of Microcell in 2005, approximately the same as Telus’
($60.18) and above that of Bell’s ($52.84).86 This leadership is attributable to its acquisition of
scale and spectrum with the Microcell purchase, its adoption of the technology that became the
global standard (GSM), it being the first provider to roll out an HSPA network and, initially, its
exclusive rights to the iPhone in Canada.87 Indeed, we document that Rogers Wireless’
EBITDA increased from less than $1 billion in 2004 to $3 billion in 2009.88
78 See Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 62.
79 This is the treatment of the acquisition by Rogers of Microcell by both Brattle and Church and Wilkins in
determining Rogers’ IRR.
80 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 62.
81 For spectrum holdings, see: Industry Canada, “A Brief History of Cellular and PCS Licensing,” October 2004.
Available online at https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/sf08251.html. For subscriber values, see: Clearnet
3Q2000 Report to Shareholders, 27 October 2000; and L. Nguyen, “New titan enters battle of cellphones,” The
Globe and Mail, 22 August 2000, p. A1.
82 L. Nguyen, “New titan enters battle of cellphones,” The Globe and Mail, 22 August 2000, p. A1.
83 As is clear from Tables 2 and 3, as well as what follows, our focus on Rogers was representative and did not
understate the returns in the industry, as alleged by the Competition Bureau.
84 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 24.
85 G. Campbell, “Global Wireless Matrix 1Q2013,” Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 15 April 2013; and G. Campbell,
“Global Wireless Matrix 4Q07,” Merrill Lynch, 21 April 2008.
86 G. Campbell, “Global Wireless Matrix 1Q2013,” Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 15 April 2013.
87 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 27.
88 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 27.
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A comparison of the financial performance of Rogers and Telus from 1999 to 2012 is very
instructive, both with respect to (i) the relative returns of Rogers and Telus and (ii) the
importance of the Clearnet transaction for Telus. In 1999 and 2000, prior to the Clearnet
transaction, Telus’ EBIDTA was less than half that of Rogers. In 2001, the year of the Clearnet
transaction, Telus’ EBIDTA is about three-quarters that of Rogers. From 2002 to 2005, Telus’
EBIDTA is larger than Rogers, but then there is a remarkable change as Rogers rides the data
revolution. Over the period 2006-2012, Rogers’ EBIDTA exceeds that of Telus every year, and
over this period, Telus’ EBIDTA is only approximately 72 per cent of Rogers’.89 Furthermore,
Rogers’ investment in GSM technology and its initial iPhone exclusivity in the mid-2000s
allowed it to offer attractive new services to consumers while Bell and Telus scrambled to
catch up.90
The Brattle Group’s assessment that Telus and Rogers’ wireless operations “are generally
earning above-normal returns on their investments, consistent with the exercise of market
power” (emphasis added) is not supported by its analysis. The results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate
that any assessment that there is inefficient market power and above-normal returns clearly
depends on the accuracy of the forecasts for the future evolution of the industry. As we discuss
next, the estimates of profitability do not appear to be a very firm foundation for a compelling
case of market failure that warrants the costs of policy intervention. They are small and not
likely robust to the assumptions made by the Brattle Group.
ROBUSTNESS OF THE BRATTLE GROUP ANALYSIS
In this section we consider the robustness of the excess profit margins found by the Brattle
Group — based on the future profitability of the wireless sector. The small excess returns
found may not be robust to changes in assumptions. The margin can disappear either because
the IRR is overestimated or the WACC is underestimated. In what follows, we identify issues
with both the IRR and WACC estimates that suggest the estimated margins in the Brattle
Report are too large.
IRR 
We begin by noting that, as with our IRR, all of the IRR estimated are based on realized
revenues and costs. It is important to remember that the appropriate comparison is ex ante, that
is, between the expected IRR and the cost of capital before the investment is made. An ex post
analysis of profitability, involving comparisons between the realized IRR and the cost of
capital can be very deceptive. Significant returns are required ex post, if the investment is
successful, in order to compensate for the risk of failure at the time of the investment. A
realization of ex post profitability must therefore be interpreted very carefully.
89 The analysis here provides additional support for why we do not think the Brattle upper bound on Telus’ IRR is
relevant. During the important years for profitability, 2006 to 2012, Rogers’ financials are better than those of Telus,
casting doubt on whether Telus’ IRR can exceed that of Rogers, which it does under the assumptions of the upper-
bound estimate.
90 See, for example: C. McLean, "Rogers’ wireless hunch paying off,” The Globe and Mail, 2 November 2007, p. B5.
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For instance, suppose that there are two possible outcomes to an investment project that are
equally likely. If the project is a success, the IRR is 30 per cent. If the project is a failure the
IRR is zero per cent. The expected IRR is 15 per cent. If the cost of capital is also 15 per cent,
returns would be competitive. But an ex post comparison would indicate excess profits if the
project was successful, since it would involve comparing a realized IRR of 30 per cent to a
cost of capital equal to 15 per cent.91 The analysis of the IRR to 2030 demonstrates that for the
expected return to substantially exceed the cost of capital for Rogers, its free cash flow from
2013 to 2030 likely must be well above current levels.
The Brattle Group argues that its assumption of constant real cash flows likely results in IRR
estimates that are too low.92 The rationale is that investments in 2012, and indeed 2013, were
likely above what is required to maintain its operations and should be expected to lead to
growth. For corroborating evidence it shows that Rogers Wireless’ free cash flow was 12.2 per
cent higher in the first three quarters of 2013 relative to 2012.93 However, increasing
competition over not just price, but price and quality also, may well mean that investment is
required to preserve sales volume. Rogers’ free cash flow from wireless for the first six months
of 2014 is only 3.6 per cent higher than for the same time in 2013, with operating profit less
than three per cent higher. This is close to having constant real cash flows.94
Given the magnitude and unpredictability of technological change in telecommunications, an
assumption of stable real cash flows actually seems optimistic. In this regard, the maturation
and commoditization of voice is relevant. As demonstrated in our study, increased competition
between the three incumbents led to a drop in voice revenues per minute by more than 30 per
cent over the period 2006 to 2012.95 As the three incumbents invest in their networks and
reduce capacity constraints on data transmission, prices for data plans — as discussed above —
have also started to fall. As well as concerns over prices, subscriber growth is likely to be an
issue. Rogers’ net wireless postpaid additions were only 40,000 in the first half of 2014, down
from 130,000 in the first half of 2013.96
WACC
There are two fundamental difficulties with the estimates Brattle uses to derive the WACC. The
WACC values are from Bloomberg, but apparently (i) available only for the period 2000 to
2012 and (ii) available only for the consolidated operations of Telus and Rogers, not their
wireless operations. As a result, the Brattle Group argues that the WACC for the consolidated
operations of Telus and Rogers is applicable to their wireless operations, and it has to estimate
the WACC for the years prior to 2000 and after 2012. 
91 This example is from G. Niels, H. Jenkins, and J. Kavanagh (2011) Economics for Competition Lawyers, Oxford
University Press, pp. 163-164.
92 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 67.
93 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 67.
94 Rogers News Release, “Rogers communications Reports Second Quarter 2014 Results,” 24 July 2014. Available
online at http://www.rogers.com/cms/investors/pdf/quarterly-results/2014-Q2_Results-Release.pdf.
95 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 41-42.
96 Rogers News Release, Rogers communications Reports Second Quarter 2014 Results.
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The WACC values for years prior to 2000 are estimated by adding the average risk premium
above the 10-year Canadian bond rate from 2000-2012 to the long bond rate from 1986 (or
1988 in the case of Telus). The WACC value for the years 2013 to 2030 are assumed to equal
the real rate average from 2010-2012 plus a two per cent adjustment for inflation. The WACC
compared to the IRR is the weighted average annual WACC, where the annual weights are the
share of real investment. 
This methodology likely underestimates the WACC applicable for investment in wireless
operations:
• The risk premium over the consolidated WACC from 2000 to 2012 is extremely unlikely to
be representative of the risk premiums associated with investments in wireless by Telus and
Rogers in the 1980s and 1990s. It may be true that wireless operations in the 2000s,
especially in the later years of that decade, account for the majority of Telus and Rogers’
earnings, but that is certainly not the case when the initial investments in wireless were
made. As discussed in our study, the financial community thought Rogers’ investments in
wireless, even in the early part of the 2000s, were risky.97
• The low interest rate environment from 2010-2012 is unlikely to persist for the next 18
years. Given the weighting put on the WACC for the period 2013-2030 (44 per cent for
Telus and 51 per cent for Rogers), the effect is to bias the WACC downwards.
Adjustments for these two factors can have a significant effect on the WACC. For instance,
increasing the risk premium to 5.4 per cent from 2.7 per cent for Telus, increases its pre-tax
WACC from 1988 to 2030 by one per cent.98 The effect of assuming that the WACC average
over the period 2013 to 2030 is the same as over the period 1988 to 2012 is to raise the WACC
during the forecasted period from 7.2 per cent to 8.7 per cent, and increases Telus’ pre-tax
WACC from 1988 to 2030 by one per cent. Making both adjustments raises Telus’ pre-tax
WACC from 1988 to 2030 by 2.6 per cent. This is more than sufficient to eliminate the excess-
return margin of 2.3 per cent calculated by Brattle for Telus.
Conclusion on Brattle’s Profitability Analysis
Given the potential costs of imperfect regulation, the threshold for regulatory intervention
should be set high. It is not enough that there is some evidence of inefficient market power.
The evidence must be compelling: the indicated magnitude substantial and the evidence robust.
An indicator is robust if it is not fragile to changes in assumptions or data. In this regard, it is
hard to interpret the Brattle Group’s analysis as providing robust evidence of substantial market
power that warrants regulatory intervention.
The Bureau challenged our conclusions on the basis that we failed to measure Rogers’ cost of
capital and the implication that this measure was necessary to reach a conclusion. We think that
the comparison between the IRR and the cost of capital is what was meant by the Competition
Bureau with its vague suggestion (at the time) that our interpretation of the results is somehow
incorrect. Indeed, Rogers’ cost of capital was not explicitly measured in our analysis. However,
the results of the analysis suggest that Rogers’ IRR (even assuming large future free cash 
97 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 24.
98 While this is a doubling of the risk premium, it still results in a WACC during the initial years of wireless service
deployment that is less than the 15 per cent discount rate used in two financial analysis to value Microcell’s
EBITDA. See: Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2014-76 Responses to Interrogatories, Table Bell-Q25-iii.
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flows) was low.99 The returns were put into context by comparing them with returns from other
sectors that were much higher and less risky.100 The obvious conclusion was that Rogers’
returns are not indicative of substantial excessive profitability and did not suggest a substantial
inefficient exercise of market power by Rogers. The Brattle Group does consider one measure
of the WACC for Telus and Rogers: explicit introduction of the WACC does not change our
conclusion. The analysis of the Brattle Group’s excessive profitability margins establishes that
they are not substantial or robust and therefore cannot be a basis sufficient to justify the costs
of regulatory intervention.101 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
The Competition Bureau, supported in part by the analysis of the Brattle Group, suggest that
our international comparisons are inadequate and therefore presumably do not support a
conclusion that the inefficient exercise of market power in Canadian wireless services is not an
issue.102 Both focus on the United States and argue that if it is a relevant competitive
benchmark, then lower penetration levels, lower minutes of use, and higher voice revenue per
minute of use in Canada indicate that wireless services in Canada are less competitive than in
the U.S.103 However our point, also echoed by the Brattle Group, is that international
comparisons of outcomes are not informative of market power and the extent of competition.104
The U.S. is not a relevant competitive benchmark based on performance. Indeed, we go to
great lengths to explain why the observed penetration rate in Canada is not attributable to
insufficient competition, but instead to differences in demand.105 It is astonishing — especially
after the experience with the 2008 AWS entrants — that the Brattle Group would trot out the
argument that Canada’s penetration rate would be similar to the rest of the world if we had
entrants that focused on the prepaid market and offered lower-priced voice and text options.106
99 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 25-26.
100 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 26.
101 Two other points of concern regarding our profitability analysis were raised by a referee. Both are based on the
premise that the low rate of return for Rogers reflects cost inefficiencies. One source of possible cost inefficiency is
X-inefficiency. X-inefficiency captures the hypothesis that for firms where there is separation of ownership from
control, market power and the absence of competition results in higher costs. However, it seems unlikely that
Rogers’ low internal rates of return are a result of X-inefficiency, given the extent of price and non-price competition
from two similar rivals, Telus’ similar rates of return, and the role of the Rogers family as owners and managers,
suggesting limited separation of ownership from control. The second source of cost inefficiency is that the high-
investment/high-quality outcome in Canada reflects over-investment by the three incumbents. Under this hypothesis,
the three incumbents engage in strategic over-investment to prevent entry and expansion by rivals. A corollary is that
Canadians would be better off with lower quality and lower-price networks. This also seems improbable because: (i)
the low rates of return are not consistent with preserving monopoly power; (ii) co-ordination by the three firms on
investment to deter entry is even less probable than co-ordination over prices, which, as demonstrated below, is not
consistent with the evidence; (iii) the adoption of new technologies and faster speeds was distinctively asymmetrical,
with Rogers being the leader, and hence not consistent with co-ordination; and (iv) the AWS entrants did provide a
lower-quality/lower-price option that was not adopted by Canadians (see: Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition,
pp. 43-44). See: J. Church and R. Ware, (2000), Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, San Francisco:
McGraw-Hill, Sections 3.4.2 and 4.4.1, for a discussion of X-inefficiency. See discussion infra in Section 4 and the
discussion of price competition in Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 41-42.
102 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2013-685 Submission, para. 12. Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2014-
76 Submission, para. 17 and para. 25. Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 14.
103 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 14.
104 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 17. Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 20.
105 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 7-9.
106 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 13.
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But international comparisons of market structure — the number of firms and their market
shares — are easy to make and are potentially informative. The empirical regularities
documented in our study are informative regarding the potential for an additional entrant to be
viable and the exercise of market power. As discussed above, if Canadian markets were more
concentrated than international markets, there might be an indication of inefficient market
power. But that is simply not the case. 
UNILATERAL MARKET POWER AND CONCENTRATION
The submissions from the Competition Bureau in Undue Discrimination and Wholesale
Wireless fail to appreciate the difference between the efficient and inefficient exercise of
market power and the role of concentration. As the Competition Bureau notes, “mobile
wireless markets are characterized by high concentration and very high barriers to entry and
expansion.”107 With large economies of scale and scope, as well as large fixed and sunk
investments, the wireless market will inevitably be “concentrated,” in the sense of having
fewer major participants than some other industries. The question is not whether or not the
market is concentrated, but whether or not it is excessively concentrated. 
This fundamental point continues to elude other commentators as well. For example,
Globalive’s reply comments in Undue Discrimination cite the conclusion of a report by the
Canadian Media Research Concentration Project: “wireless markets in Canada, whether
measured by revenue, spectrum held, spectrum in use or subscribers, or at level [sic] of the
country as a whole, specific provinces and Canada’s nine biggest cities … are remarkably
concentrated.”108 High concentration and high margins should not be surprising given the
technology of production, nor does this contradict any of our findings. Without further
consideration, the presence of high concentration levels is not indicative of a competition
problem. Our analysis, on the other hand, points to the level of concentration and margins
being consistent with competition.
The Competition Bureau, in Wholesale, points to the evidence of the Brattle Group for support
of the proposition that the concentration in Canadian wireless markets is consistent with the
inefficient exercise of market power.109 As indicated above, the Brattle Group’s evidence on the
profitability of wireless services and international comparisons does not support a robust
finding of the substantial exercise of inefficient market power, consistent with justifying
remedial regulatory measures. 
107 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2013-685 Submission, para. 9. Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2014-76
Submission, para. 11 and para. 26.
108
“Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2013-685, Wholesale mobile wireless roaming in Canada — Unjust
discrimination/undue preference — Reply Comments of Globalive Wireless Management Corp. (WIND Mobile),” 10
February 2014, at footnote 11. Available online at
https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2073501.
109 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2014-76 Submission, para. 25.
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The Efficiency of Entry
The second challenge to our study by the Competition Bureau has nothing to do with whether
wireless services are, or are not, competitive. Instead, the Competition Bureau originally
suggested that our analysis was deficient with respect to the efficiency of further entry because
it did not consider the relationship between spectrum availability and the costs of network
build-out.110 The Competition Bureau then clarified in its Wholesale submission, based on the
Brattle Report, its efficiency analysis and, by implication, its disagreement with our conclusion
on the limited benefits of additional entry and its inefficiency.111
The Brattle Group’s analysis is not a complete efficiency analysis that considers the benefits of
entry by a fourth national carrier. Instead, the Brattle Group provides estimates of the following
three components of such an analysis:
• The Brattle Group estimates that the increase in consumer welfare from a fourth national
entrant would be $1 billion a year. Of this, $220 million is from lower prices and increased
consumption of wireless services: the balance is attributable to the extra benefit consumers
would get from consuming the services of the entrant instead of those of one of the
incumbents (“entrant brand value” according to the Brattle Report).112
• The Brattle Group estimates the variable profits of the fourth national carrier to be $843
million, while variable profits of the existing carriers would decrease by $855 million
annually. The change in industry variable profits would be a loss of $12 million annually.113
• The Brattle Group estimates a cost to the three incumbents of reducing spectrum
availability to each by 10 MHz. This spectrum is presumably used to support the fourth
national carrier instead. They estimate that it would result in increased capital costs for the
three incumbents of approximately $370 million.114 This is not an annual estimate, but the
net present value of additional capital required by 2017.
For a full efficiency analysis, however, the $1 billion increase in total surplus — the
competitive benefits — must be compared to the costs of entry. The costs of entry are not just
the extra $370 million of extra capital costs for the three incumbents, but also include the
capital costs of rolling out the fourth network, the costs of subsidization, and any lost benefits
from a reduction in price and non-price competition because the market allocation of spectrum
is prohibited by government policy. As discussed above, the relaxation of capacity constraints
on the three incumbents might have a measureable effect on the terms of their services,
including prices.
110 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2013-685 Submission, para. 11:
Second, the C-W Report appears to suggest that, because of the presence of significant scale and
network economies in the provision of mobile wireless services, entry by an additional competitor
in the market would lead to significant cost inefficiencies. Such a conclusion is premature; an in-
depth analysis of the relationship between the limits on spectrum availability and the costs of
network build-out is necessary to properly address any such effect.
111 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2014-76 Submissions, paras. 50-54.
112 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 2, p. 20, and p. 44.
113 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 38.
114 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, pp. 52-53.
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The Competition Bureau and the Brattle Group have not shown that entry is efficient. Indeed
before even addressing the question of efficiency, the natural starting point might have been to
ask whether entry was profitable without subsidization. On this, the Competition Bureau
appears to misinterpret the evidence of the Brattle Group by indicating that entry may be
viable.115 The Brattle Group is explicit in that it does not consider whether such entry is
viable.116 The evidence in Church and Wilkins on the viability of a fourth carrier is not
addressed by the Competition Bureau or the Brattle Group.117
Our analysis, summarized above, focuses on the existence of a natural limit and its
implications for sustainability and efficiency. In that context, the costs and benefits of the 2008
AWS entrants were discussed above. That the economic value created by the entrants is small
arises because their entry was duplicative and their offerings unpopular. The cost inefficiencies
we highlight are the potential loss of scale economies to the incumbents and, especially, the
inefficient mix of technologies associated with reducing the amount of spectrum available to
the incumbents. We observed the following:118 
… it is also likely that consumers will be harmed because incumbents are denied
spectrum, raising their costs (as they substitute capital for spectrum inefficiently),
reducing the quality and coverage of their networks, and perhaps product variety,
relative to what they might have been if the incumbents had more spectrum. In this
regard, consider the 2008 AWS auction set aside, under which 40 MHz of AWS
spectrum out of a total of 90 MHz was not available to the incumbents. Because
Bell and Telus failed to separately win 20 MHz in key provinces, the extent of
cooperation between the two in rolling out their LTE networks may have been
enhanced. Telus and Bell may well have had a network-sharing agreement to roll
out their LTE networks even without the set-asides, but the presence of the set-
asides restricted their options. A significant cost of the 2008 set-aside may have
been that it resulted in Bell and/or Telus being substantially constrained in their
ability to make choices regarding their future network evolution. Instead of
allocating AWS spectrum to the incumbents who would use it to increase their
speed and capacity for data, it has instead been allocated to entrants who have
focused on voice and text. Canadians ended up with an incorrect mix of networks
and inefficient allocation of spectrum. 
The potential for lost scale economies and the importance of adequate spectrum for efficient
rollout of data-centric networks seems obvious given the explosion in demand for mobile data.
But more importantly, our analysis focused on the overall inefficiency of entry, of which cost
inefficiencies are only one aspect.
115 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2014-76 Submission, para 51: “The Brattle Report indicates that (i) the
Canadian wireless sector may support efficient entry by an additional carrier…” See also Commissioner of
Competition, 2014-76 Responses to Interrogatories, Bureau (Bell Mobility), 9 Jun 14-21.
116 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 55: 
Although we find evidence that Canadian wireless carriers may possess market power and that there
could be substantial surplus gains to added competition, further analysis is necessary to determine
whether the Canadian wireless industry could sustain an additional nationwide carrier. In order to be
viable, the new carrier must expect to earn at least a normal return on the investment required to
create an additional nationwide network. The analyses undertaken do not directly address whether
the new or emerging nationwide carrier could expect to earn at least a normal return on its
investment. Moreover, our analyses do not examine whether incumbents would continue to earn
normal or above normal profits with additional entry into the Canadian wireless market.
117 See discussion supra.
118 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 36.
The analysis in our report establishes:119
• That further entry is likely inefficient. The benefits from entry — increased consumption of
wireless services — are likely very much less than the costs of entry, where the costs of
entry are the opportunity costs of the resources used by the entrants to provide service,
including spectrum and the capital costs of their networks.
• That in the long run, consumers might not benefit from further entry because of cost
inefficiencies arising from reduced scale and reduced access to scarce spectrum, eventual
consolidation due to insufficient gross margins, and reduced incentives for future
investment.
Indeed an additional cost of subsidization of a fourth carrier might arise if the commitment by
the government to accommodate expansion of entrants by denying the incumbents access to
spectrum reduces their investment and willingness to innovate.120 
The difference between our analysis and that of the Brattle Group is on the magnitude and the
nature of the competitive benefits of entry. The Brattle Group suggests benefits of $1 billion
per year, while our analysis, based on the actual record of entry by the 2008 AWS entrants,
suggests that the competitive benefits of entry are negligible. In the next section, we explain
why the benefits of an entry by a fourth national carrier estimated by the Brattle Group are not
likely indicative of the competitive benefits of entry. They are likely unreliable and
overestimated.
THE BRATTLE GROUP’S ESTIMATE OF THE BENEFITS FROM COMPETITIVE ENTRY
The Brattle Group’s analysis is based on: (i) an event study and (ii) a market simulation. The
event study looks at the effect on the share prices of Bell, Rogers, and Telus of Verizon’s
announcement that it was not going to enter the Canadian market after there were indications
that it might. The increase in their share value is used to calibrate what the wireless sector
would look like if Verizon — or a Verizon-like entrant — entered the Canadian wireless sector
and provided service. The net present value of the loss in variable profits implied by the loss in
share prices is used as the foundation for the market simulation. The Brattle Report market
simulation is based on a well-known merger simulation approach to determine what the post-
entry equilibrium in the wireless sector — by province — would have to be for entry to result
in the required loss in variable profits. 
Unfortunately, event studies are not well known for their accuracy in predicting the effect of
events on the exercise of market power and the particular modeling choice by the Brattle
Group for modeling consumer preferences for wireless services — the logit model of
differentiated products — is not well known for its suitability for modeling competitive
interactions in an oligopoly where products are differentiated.
As discussed below, the logit specification imposes very restrictive substitution patterns on
consumers that likely make it inappropriate for assessing the effects of entry in wireless
services. The specification imposes restrictions on cross-price elasticities of demand and   
119 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 35-36 and p. 44.
120 We thank a referee for this observation.
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patterns of substitution that mean it is not useful when product differentiation and patterns of
substitution are likely to be asymmetrical, in particular when some products are better
substitutes than others. This shows up in two ways: (i) it will indicate substitution from some
products to others even though they are not very good substitutes and (ii) it will underestimate
substitution between products that are very close substitutes. Thus this model is not likely to
provide much insight on the price effects of additional entry.
The logit specification also has a tendency to overestimate the benefits to consumers from
entry when their choice set expands. It will predict substitution to the new entrant’s variety and
therefore find increased consumer value from consuming a more preferred variety — even if
such substitution would not happen because the existing variety and the new entrant’s variety
are not good substitutes. It will also assume a substantial increase in consumer value from
consuming a more preferred variety even if the new entrant’s variety is very similar to an
incumbent’s offering. 
Event-Study Analysis 
The literature on the utility of event-study analysis for predicting the effects on profitability of
a merger is informative since it involves similar considerations as those relevant here: the
effect on a change in the number of competitors on profits and hence share valuation. The
assessment in the literature is that the short-run responses of stock prices are often positively,
but weakly, correlated with the actual effects on profitability of a merger, including an increase
in profits from an increase in market power.121 That is, while the short-run reaction of the stock
market to a merger generally predicts the direction of change correctly, the magnitude of the
estimate is not very precise. 
It is not hard to see why: it is unlikely that traders are able to accurately assess the profitability
effects of a merger if the event window is small. In some sense, the assumption underlying the
Brattle analysis is that, while it works backwards from the stock market effect to the predicted
equilibrium, stock market participants are able to work forward — from their predictions of the
effect of Verizon’s entry on profits to stock market valuations — as accurately as the Brattle
Group, and in the window from the announcement of Verizon’s potential entry to its ultimate
decision not to enter. Such an assumption has, in a very understated way, been characterized as
questionable.122 Using an event study to pin down the effect of another entrant on competition 
121 See: P. Pautler, (2003), “Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions,” Antitrust Bulletin, Spring 2003: 119- 221, at pp.
135-136 for a review of the literature. The study of 20 mergers in the edited collection by S. Kaplan, (2000), Mergers
and Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, appears to have been particularly persuasive in establishing
the assessment that “the stock market’s initial reaction to a merger is often a poor forecast of the merger’s ultimate
profitability.” See: M. Whinston, (2007), “Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers,” in M. Armstrong and R.
Porter eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3, North-Holland: 2369-2440, at p. 2424. A recent study
that confirms the weak effect of estimated changes in profitability on the stock market reaction to merger
announcements is T. Duso, K. Gugler, and B. Yurtoglu, (2010), “Is the event study methodology useful for merger
analysis? A comparison of stock market and accounting data,” International Review of Law and Economics, 30: 186-
192. Two former chief economists for the Directorate General Competition of the European Commission suggest that
event studies might no longer be used by the U.S. antitrust agencies. See: T. Duso, D. Neven, and L.-H. Roller,
(2007), “The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data,” Journal of Law &
Economics, 50: 455-489 at p. 465.
122 See: M. Whinston, “Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Merger,” at p. 2424. Whinston observes (footnote omitted):
Any suggestion that an antitrust authority should primarily rely on event-study analysis presumes
that stock market participants are able to forecast the competitive effects of mergers more
accurately (and faster) than is the agency, perhaps a questionable assumption.
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is unlikely a suitable basis on which to construct a simulation model and expect that the results
of the model will be accurate. 
Simulation Based on the Logit Model of Product Differentiation
The simulation model used by the Brattle Group assumes that wireless service providers
compete over price and have differentiated products. The nature of demand for their
differentiated products is modeled using the logit model. The logit model assumes that
consumers make a discrete choice from a set of options. They do not choose how much to
consume, but what to consume. The assumption is that they select, from the set of choices, the
option (product) that maximizes their net benefit. Included in their choice set is the option of
not purchasing from the set of products and instead purchasing the so-called outside option:
instead of purchasing wireless services from one of the providers, they opt not to have wireless
services. The logit model assumes that consumers’ value of a particular choice consists of two
elements: (i) a common valuation of the consumption value or benefit and (ii) a component
that is consumer specific. The consumer specific component is independently and identically
distributed across all consumers.123
The logit model is informationally parsimonious: it requires information only on total market
size, market shares, and prices, plus estimates of two parameters. One of these is the elasticity
of demand for wireless services, which captures the willingness of consumers to substitute
away from wireless services to other products as the market price of wireless services increase.
The other is a parameter that captures the willingness of consumers to substitute between
wireless service providers as the price of one of those providers increases. The logit model
therefore imposes by assumption that the willingness of consumers to substitute from provider
i to provider j is the same as the willingness of consumers to substitute from provider i to k.
The cross-price elasticity between wireless service providers is simply the product of three
terms: the market share and price of the good whose price increases, as well as the parameter
that governs substitution between wireless providers. This means that the ratio of cross-price
elasticities for any two services with respect to the price increase of a third service is one.
The restriction on cross-price elasticities follows from the property of the irrelevance of
independent alternatives (IIA) of the logit model. In the logit model, the ratio of choice
probabilities between any two options is equal to the ratio of the shares of those two options.
Thus, the choice between two products i and j is independent of the availability of any other
good, the total number of choices/goods, or the price of any other good other than the prices of
i and j. It means that if there are three options, with shares of 60, 30, and 10 per cent for
products A, B, and C, that if the price of C were to rise, consumers of C would substitute to A
and B in the ratio of 2 to 1, thereby maintaining their share and choice-probability ratio. Equal
cross-price elasticities insure this outcome since they result in an equal per centage change in
the quantity of A and B from a change in the price of C. For this reason, the logit model’s 
123 For instance in the linear specification used by the Brattle Group, consumer j’s net benefit from option i is assumed
to be Uji = δi – α pi + ξji, where δi is the benefit (common to all consumers of option i), pi the price of i, and ξji the
consumer-specific value of option i. Under the assumptions of the logit model, the distribution of ξji is the extreme
value distribution function. The parameter α governs the willingness to shift from option i to option k as the price of
i increases. See: G. Werden and L. Froeb, (1994), “The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries:
Logit Demand and Merger Policy,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 10: 407-426.
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ability to predict the outcomes from price changes is typically limited. The potential for error
arises because: (i) it will indicate substitution from some products to others even though they
are not very good substitutes and (ii) it will underestimate substitution between products that
are very close substitutes. 
The IIA property also gives rise to the “red bus/blue bus” problem that makes it problematic to
consider the welfare effects of new product introduction.124 Assume that there are two options
for a commuter, taking the blue bus and driving their car. Suppose further that it is equally
likely that a given commuter will find each optimal, i.e., their ratio of choice probabilities is
one to one. In aggregate this means that the market shares of the blue bus and driving will be a
half: half will prefer the blue bus, while half will prefer driving.
Now suppose a third option becomes available: the choice set of commuters is expanded by the
addition of the option of taking a red bus. The red bus option is identical to the blue bus in
every other way except for the colour of the bus. Assuming no effect on prices from entry and
that consumers do not care about the colour of the bus, one might expect that shares post entry
should remain half for cars and half for bus transportation, with the share of bus transportation
split equally between the red and blue bus. One might also expect that the introduction of the
red bus would not only disproportionately affect demand for the blue bus, but welfare gains to
consumers would arise only if prices fell from increased competition from entry by the red bus
and the social gains of entry by the red bus arise from any switching from the outside option
(staying at home) to commuting in response to the change in price. One would not expect
welfare gains because the red bus provides an option to some commuters that is a better match
to their preferences than the existing options.
The logit model of consumer preferences for differentiated products does not result in this
pattern of substitution or welfare gains. Instead, consumers would have a common and equal
valuation of the shared- or common-component value of the red and blue bus and the shares
(assuming unchanged prices) across all three transport options would be one-third each. Notice
that the share ratio between cars and the blue bus would remain at 1:1, the expected
consequence of the IIA property. The welfare gains would be indicated in the logit model not
only from expansion of the market from lower prices, but also from consumers switching from
cars and the blue bus option to the red bus option because it is more highly valued. Of course,
contrary to the predictions of the logit model, those using cars are unlikely to switch to the red
bus option and not much, if any, value is created from consuming a different bus option simply
because it is a different colour. The logit model will substantially overestimate the value of
increasing brand diversity in these circumstances.
124 See: D. McFadden, (1974), “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behaviour,” in P. Zarembka ed.
Frontiers in Econometrics, New York: Academic Press, 105-142. The “red bus/blue bus” problem is recognized as a
limitation by the Brattle Group, and that it is not surprising that its approach results in large benefits from entry
(Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 41). The source of the large gain related to the logit model is from consumers
switching to a brand that they prefer — what the Brattle Report refers to as “Entrant Brand Value.” Our sources for
the discussions of the limitations of the logit model in what follows are P. Davis and E. Garces, (2010), Quantitative
Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis, Princeton: Princeton University Press and D. Gore, et al, (2013),
The Economic Assessment of Mergers under European Competition Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Calibration of the Logit Model by the Brattle Group
The logit specification of preferences means that the equilibrium price and quantities when
there are N service providers is determined by a number of equations.125 The condition for each
service provider to maximize its profits is:
mj = 
(pj – cj )
=  
1
=        
1
(1)
pj ηjj α pj (1 – sj )
or
mj = 
(pj – cj )
=  
1
=                 
p
(2)
pj ηjj [α p (1 – sj ) + εsj ] pj
where pj is the price of wireless provider j, cj is the marginal cost of provider j, mj the price cost
margin of firm j, sj the choice probability for provider j, ηjj is the own price elasticity of
provider j, p is the average wireless price, ε is the market elasticity for wireless services, α the
parameter that determines substitution between wireless providers, and sj  the market share of
wireless services for provider j. Equation (2) is the usual condition that profit-maximization
requires the firm to select is price such that its relative profit margin equals one over its
elasticity of demand. 
The other equations specify demand for each of the N inside good options and the outside
option. The choice probability of inside option j is implicitly defined by
ln (sj) – ln (so) = δj – αpj (3)
where δj is the common value of the consumption benefits of good j and so the probability that
no wireless service is selected. The choice probability that no wireless service is selected is  
so = 
ε (4)
α p          
The relationship between the probability of service j being selected and its share of all wireless
services (its market share) is
sj = (1 – so ) sj (5)
We find it easier not to express the profit-maximizing condition, as the Brattle Group does,
based on choice probabilities (equation (1)), but instead based on shares of wireless services
(equation (2)).





The variables that are estimated externally to the model or assumed in the set of equations (2)
through (4) are the following:
• the share of wireless services for each provider sj .126
• the margin of firm j, mj, estimated from financial information.127
• the price of firm j, pj, assumed to be wireless provider i’s ARPU.
• the average price p is the share weighted average price of all providers.
• the market elasticity, ε, assumed.
The unknowns in equations (2) through (4) that the calibration exercise solves for are:
• the choice probability of the outside good — i.e., the no-wireless option, so.
• the common valuation or benefit parameter of each good j, δj.
• the parameter governing substitution between wireless service providers, α.
The unknowns in equations (2) through (4) can be solved as functions of the variables that are
known or estimated.128 The Brattle Group then goes back and uses (1) to resolve for the
marginal cost of each provider cj. 
In calibrating the logit model — finding the unknowns as described above — the Brattle
Report makes a number of assumptions. These include the following:
• The calibration is done by province. This requires an ARPU by province. But the only data
available on ARPU by carrier are national, and the ARPU available by province is averaged
across all carriers. As a result, the Brattle Group assume that the ratio of two carriers’
ARPU by province is the same as the ratio nationally. This, when used with the definition
that the ARPU in a province is the weighted average (by shares) of the carrier’s provincial
ARPUs, allows for the Brattle Group to solve for provincial ARPU by carrier/provider.129
• Since the calibration is done by province, it requires an estimate of the demand elasticity
for wireless services by province. The Brattle Group assumes a range of elasticities (from
0.5 to 1.0) and that the most inelastic demand is in Alberta, the province with the highest
ARPU, while the province with the most elastic demand is Quebec, the province with the
lowest ARPU. It uses these two points to estimate a line between observed ARPU and
elasticity. This linear relationship is used, along with the ARPU for the other provinces, to
estimate the elasticity for each of the other provinces.130
126 From the CRTC, Monitoring Report 2013, Table 5.5.5.
127 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 75, Table B-1.
128 Only one of the profit-maximizing conditions is required. Since there are N of them, the results would be specific to
which one was used. The Brattle Report therefore uses three of them by selecting the unknowns to minimize the sum
of squared errors across the profit-maximizing conditions for the three incumbents (Bell, Rogers, and Telus). The
calibration of the Brattle Group is not standard, in the sense that it is usual to assume values for both the market
elasticity and the parameter, controlling substitution between wireless service providers, and then resolve for each
providers’ marginal cost. See: G. Werden and L. Froeb, (1996), “Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger
Policy in Differentiated Products Industries,” in M Coate and A. Kleit, eds. The Economics of the Antitrust Process,
Kluwer: Boston, 65-88, at p. 79.
129 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 73.
130 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 76.
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The end result of the calibration is that all of the parameters required to solve for equations (2)
through (4) for prices and quantities are known. These parameters are the marginal costs (cj),
the elasticity of market demand (ε), the substitution parameter (α), and the common value
parameters (δj).
Entry Simulation by the Brattle Group
The final step in the three-step process to determine the effects of a fourth national entrant is to
combine the calibrated logit model with the results of the event study. The gain in market value
from Verizon not entering is converted into an equivalent expected annual loss in variable
profits for each of Bell, Rogers, and Telus. The logit model is expanded by adding another
provider. To add another provider requires two parameters: the common value of its
consumption benefits and its marginal cost. The Brattle Group assumes that the additional
provider’s marginal cost is the average of all existing providers in that province.131
The common value parameter for the entrant is determined from all other existing parameters
and the reduction in the variable profits of the three incumbents predicted by the event study.
The variable profits for each of the three incumbents — Bell, Rogers, and Telus — can be
written as a function of all the parameters of the model — determined by the calibration — and
the unknown value parameter of the entrant. The reduction of variable profits of approximately
eight per cent for each incumbent is assumed to be constant across all of the provinces. In each
province, the predicted value of the variable profits is set equal to the variable profit function
and solved for the unknown value parameter for the entrant.132
Armed with the common value parameter and the marginal cost of the entrant, the Brattle
Group can then determine the underlying equilibrium provincial prices and quantities for every
carrier in a province. By comparing this equilibrium from the logit model to the pre-entry
equilibrium, the Brattle Group is able to make predictions regarding the effect of the fourth
national carrier on provincial prices, quantities (penetration), variable profits, and consumer
welfare (consumer surplus). The key results highlighted by the Brattle Group and the
Competition Bureau are the increase in consumer welfare, in particular the large increase in
consumer surplus from expanding the choice set of consumers (79 per cent of the gain), as well
as the increase in consumer surplus from a reduction in price of 1.7 per cent and an expansion
of output (penetration) of three per cent.133
131 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 79.
132 Since there are three incumbents, this would give rise to three different values for each province. The Brattle Group
therefore chooses the value parameter to minimize the sum of squared errors across these three equations for each
province. See: Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 79, footnote 146.
133 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, pp. 40, 42, and 81.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE BRATTLE GROUP ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF A NATIONAL ENTRANT
IN WIRELESS
In this section, we assess the Brattle Report’s estimates of the benefits of entry. The validity of
the analysis depends on the applicability of the logit specification and the assumptions required
for its implementation. The Brattle Report’s conclusions with respect to the competitive
benefits of a fourth national carrier are likely inaccurate and likely overestimate the benefits of
entry. The limited value of the Brattle Report’s analysis follows because of (i) the inherent
inapplicability and biases of the specification used to model consumer preferences; (ii) the lack
of foundation for the assumptions necessary to implement the model; and (iii) the failure of the
calibrated model to match outcomes pre-entry. The lack of fit between the outcomes derived
from the model and calibrated parameters with observed values pre-entry indicate that the
concerns over the specification and assumptions in implementing the model are well-founded.
Logit Specification is Unreliable for a Basis to Assess Competitive Effects of an Entrant
The simple logit model, despite the claims of the Brattle Report,134 is not particularly well
suited for antitrust analysis in differentiated markets and if it is used, it is used because there is
not a better alternative. The assumptions that the logit specification imposes on cross-price
elasticities and patterns of substitution mean that it is not useful when product differentiation
and patterns of substitution are likely to be asymmetrical (some products are better substitutes
than others). The American Bar Association notes that it is “ideal for quick, preliminary
analyses of potential price effects of mergers based on very little information”135 and that it is
useful to provide a “screen” comparable to market shares and changes in market shares in
relevant markets.136 Others are not so sanguine regarding its usefulness. For instance:137
Most strikingly, substitution patterns do not depend on how good substitutes j and k
really are, for example, whether they have similar product characteristics. Because
of the inflexible and unrealistic structure that the MNL [multinominal logit] model
imposes on preferences, they probably should never be used in merger simulation
exercises or in any other exercise where the pattern of substitution plays a central
role in informing decision makers about appropriate policy.
Our discussion of the logit model above explained the nature of the inappropriate restrictions it
imposes on patterns of substitution by consumers and its tendency to overestimate the benefits
of increased choice. 
134 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 3 and pp. 33-34.
135 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, (2005), Econometrics Chicago: ABA, p. 277.
136 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Econometrics, p. 286.
137 P. Davis and E. Garces, (2010), Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis, at p. 482. See also:
D. Gore, et al, (2013), The Economic Assessment of Mergers under European Competition Law, at pp. 216 and 524.
39
The event study used by the Brattle Group is based on entry by Verizon, a firm with product
offerings, services, and prices in the U.S. that would appear to be similar to that of Bell, Rogers,
and Telus. It does not seem sensible to have a model that predicts large gains from product
differentiation from the offerings of the fourth entrant if that entrant is Verizon or Verizon-
similar, yet that is what is assumed by the Brattle Group.138 To realize the gains from product
differentiation, as the Brattle Group itself observes, requires a different kind of entrant:139
Alternatively, relatively low overall penetration, few prepaid services, and high
usage suggest that the Canadian wireless market may lack sufficient product
differentiation in comparison to other developed countries. The combination of
lower penetration overall (particularly for prepaid services), higher ARPU, and
higher smartphone usage suggests that wireless services in Canada are focused on
higher end customers.
Postpaid and smartphone service plans are generally more expensive than prepaid
and mobile phone service plans, respectively. In this case, the entry of an additional
nationwide carrier may spur existing carriers to compete for a relatively unserved
segment of the market by offering both lower prices and more actively promoting
other types of service. As discussed below in Section IV.B, an additional nationwide
carrier may act as a “maverick” and use a different pricing and service strategy from
its competitors.
But it is very unlikely that Verizon or a Verizon-similar entrant would be a maverick or would
be anticipated by the stock market to be a maverick. Our analysis demonstrates that the usual
critique of wireless services in Canada — low penetration rates for prepaid services — is not
likely the result of a lack of competition, but instead a function of existing competition for
postpaid services and of the preferences of Canadians.140 If Verizon’s offerings are similar to
those of the existing incumbents (Bell, Telus and Rogers), it would appear that the logit model
will significantly overvalue the value created for consumers by the expansion of the choice set.
That is, the “red bus/blue bus” problem is likely to be an important consideration in why the
Brattle analysis overestimates, perhaps significantly, the benefits of entry.141
The Brattle Report downplays the “red bus/blue bus” issue.142 The authors seem to imply that
any overestimate of brand diversity benefits due to service offerings being close substitutes
would be made up by increased price competition. However, while increased price competition
would offset the loss in product diversity benefits calculated based on the logit model, the
question not answered by the Brattle Report is the extent of the offset. The issue is not the
direction, but the magnitude. Given the signs of a maturing market and the relative inelasticity
of demand for wireless services, it seems doubtful that the overestimate of the contributions to
total surplus from brand diversity could be offset to any significant extent by expansion in the
adoption of wireless services. 
138 See also Commissioner of Competition, 2014-76 Responses to Interrogatories, Bureau (Bell Mobility), 9 Jun 14-13,
9 Jun 14-14, and 9 Jun 14-18.
139 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 13.
140 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 7-9.
141 Of course, the efficiency benefits of a low-priced maverick would be similar to those of the 2008 AWS entrants,
considered in Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition.
142 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, p. 44.
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The assumption that the entrant’s marginal cost will be equal to the average of the incumbents
is also not innocuous: the brand value/common assessment of consumption benefit of the
entrant is a function of its marginal cost. The larger the marginal cost assumed, the greater the
implied brand value of the entrant must be for the variable profits of the three incumbents to be
reduced by eight per cent. This of course means that the estimate of the value created by
offering consumers another option will be larger. 
Finally, Verizon, unlike other potential national entrants, does have brand awareness in Canada.
Hence the event study calculation is not likely representative of a new entrant, but would likely
overestimate the effect of a new entrant. 
Assumptions to Implement the Logit Simulation Model
Two key inputs for the logit model are the prices and the elasticity of demand for wireless
services. The logit model is intended to capture a discrete choice by consumers: not how much
they consume, but what they consume. The Brattle Group assumes that ARPU is a price. In
reality consumers choose a service provider and a plan from that service provider. The details
of the plan selected by a subscriber includes the price for usage (price per minute or megabyte)
and subscribers choose their usage: voice, text, and data consumption. The choice made by
consumers is not discrete. As we explain in our earlier study, ARPU is not a price, but average
revenue per subscriber.143 It is a function of both prices and the quantity of services consumed.
The Brattle Group assumes elasticities across provinces differ based on the assumption that
ARPU differences reflect different elasticities of demand because of differences in
preferences.144 It assumes that high ARPU must mean inelastic demand. As we explored in our
earlier study, differences in ARPU between Quebec and Alberta are based on differences in
data consumption and smartphone penetration. The difference in ARPU, we suspect, is
primarily not explained by differences in preferences between Canadians in different provinces
(as assumed by Brattle), but instead by differences in income and economic activity. There is
no empirical support for the assumed range of elasticities (0.5 to 1.0) by the Brattle Group. The
assumed values for the elasticity of demand are an important determinant of the benefits from
increased competition. The greater the elasticity of demand, the greater the expected decrease
in price and increase in penetration from a fourth national entrant.
The assumption that differences in ARPU are a result of differences in preferences is used by
the Brattle Group to justify calculation of provincial ARPU. If it is not appropriate, then even
assuming ARPUs are a price (which they are not), the provincial prices will be in error, with
consequences for the accuracy of the calibration and simulation.
143 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, pp. 16-18.
144 Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, at p. 73 and p. 76. 
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Assessing the “Fit” of the Simulation Model
It is standard practice to assess the suitability and accuracy of a simulation model and the
assumptions required for its implementation by comparing its derived values with observed
values. The derived values can be of two sorts. The first are the model’s predictions of
outcomes, such as prices, quantities, or profits, for the industry pre-entry. The model should be
able to replicate observed outcomes for things it is intended to predict. The second are the
parameters of the model derived in the calibration, such as marginal cost. The greater the
difference between derived model values and observed values, the less confidence there should
be in its ability to accurately predict the effect of an exogenous change — here entry by a
fourth national carrier. The observed values are for 2012 unless otherwise indicated.  
The suitability of the Brattle simulation exercise can be assessed by comparing observed values
to implied values for marginal cost, variable profits, and market size. Table 4 compares the
values available for these variables with those implied by the calibrated logit model used by
Brattle:
• Market Size. Rows 1 to 4 show the population of each province and for Canada, the total
subscribers observed (as estimated by the Brattle Group) for each province and Canada
(which is the sum of the values for the ten provinces); the model’s derived value for the
total market size; and the per centage difference between the population of the province and
Canada and the estimated market size. The estimated market size is the total number of
potential buyers of wireless service. It is the total number of consumers assumed to be
choosing between the outside option and wireless service. The share of the outside option is
one of the variables solved for in the calibration of the model. The market size is the
number of estimated subscribers (Row 2) divided by the share of the outside option. This is
Row 3.
The market size is larger than the population of every province except Quebec. It ranges
from 21 per cent larger in Alberta to just under one per cent for New Brunswick. The
expectation ex ante is that the total number of individuals in a province that might be a
subscriber would be less than the population, because some would not be making the choice
between the outside option and wireless service, for instance children below a certain age.
If individuals’ have multiple accounts, however, the total market size could be larger than
the population. This might be the case if enough individuals have a work and a personal
phone.145 An interesting aspect of Row 4 is the variation across provinces and whether the
extent to which the market size exceeds the population should vary across provinces as
much as the model suggests.
If actual outside shares are lower than estimated, which would be the case if the market size
was closer to the population of a province, then the market elasticity for that province
would be smaller. For instance, an estimate of the market size closer to the population
would indicate an outside share equal to one minus the penetration rate for that province.146
145 This was certainly more prevalent in the past than it is today, likely contributing to the change in the fortunes of
Blackberry.
146 The market size would equal the population if the total number of individuals in a province that were choosing both
work and personal services equaled the total number not able to choose wireless service. 
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In the case of Saskatchewan and Ontario this would imply outside shares of 21 per cent and
20 per cent.147 This would indicate market elasticities of 0.52 and 0.55 instead of Brattle’s
assumed values of 0.74 and 0.77.148 The greater the elasticity of demand, the greater the
expected decrease in price and increase in penetration from a fourth national entrant. If the
market elasticity assumed is too large, then the model will likely overestimate the
expansion in output, reduction in price, and increase in consumer benefit, estimates that
were already relatively small.
• Marginal Costs. Rows 5 through 13 show model marginal cost for each of Bell, Rogers, and
Telus by province, Brattle’s estimate of observed variable cost for Canada, a subscriber
weighted average for Canada for each of Bell, Rogers, and Telus and the per cent
difference. The weighted average for Canada can be compared to the financial estimate
derived by the Brattle Group — but not used in the simulations. This value is 11.5 per cent
higher for Bell, almost four per cent higher for Rogers, and close to three per cent for Telus.  
The wide variability in estimates for marginal cost across carriers in a province and
between provinces is a striking feature of Table 4, that certainly provides additional
evidence that concern regarding the fit of the logit model is warranted. The logit model
estimates of marginal cost vary considerably across carriers within a province. This is an
indication that the logit-model preference parameters are not capturing the preferences of
consumers: the variation in marginal costs estimated from the logit model arise in part
because of the market share variations in the provinces. Bell’s marginal cost in the Atlantic
provinces (of which the extreme version is Newfoundland and Labrador) is likely not as
significantly less than that of Rogers and Telus as what is implied by the logit model. Bell’s
marginal cost is $9.36, Telus’ $31.03, and Rogers’ $35.75. Instead, the logit model
calibration has likely underestimated brand preference in some provinces, and for the model
to match Bell’s market share, Bell must have a substantially smaller marginal cost than
Rogers and Telus. 
• Variable Profits. Rows 14 through 18, for Canada, show the aggregate variable profits for
Bell, Rogers, and Telus, based on the derived values for the logit model pre-entry, actual
variable profits from financial statements, an alternative based on Brattle’s estimated profit
margin and number of subscribers, as well as the per centage difference between either
actual estimate and the estimate of the logit model. The two estimates for actual variable
profits in 2012 are similar, but differ substantially from the value derived from the
calibrated logit model. The difference is on the order of $2 billion and approximately 23 per
cent. This difference is obviously large and provides compelling evidence that the fit of the
Brattle model is not strong.
147 See: CRTC, Communications Monitoring Report 2013, Table 5.5.10, for provincial penetration values.
148 See equation (4) above. The comparison holds constant the inside parameter governing substitution between wireless
services (α).
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Unfortunately, we do not have access to all of the equilibrium values of the calibrated logit
model pre-entry. In particular, the Brattle Group has not provided either the ARPU values
by carrier by province or the subscriber numbers of every carrier by province. It is thus not
possible to understand why the model’s predictions for variable profits are so much larger
than actual or to use them to test for fit. In particular, comparing actual subscriber numbers
to the subscriber numbers by carrier from the calibrated logit model might be very
informative.
What can be determined is that some combination of the price and subscriber counts for
Bell, Rogers, and Telus is responsible for more than two-thirds of the difference between
actual variable profits and model variable profits. About 30 per cent of the aggregate profit
difference is attributable to the difference in marginal costs. The only other two possibilities
are a difference in quantity (subscribers) or price.149
Moreover, it is the value of variable profits derived from the logit model — not actual
variable profits — that the Brattle Report applies the implied loss in annual variable profits
from the event study to determine the common consumer valuation. The inaccuracy of the
variable profits in the calibration stage feed into the predictions for estimating the effects of
the entrant. Despite this difficulty, it may be the case that a reduction of eight per cent on
actual variable profits would result in parameters for the entrant which are not sensible and
simulation outcomes that are similarly not plausible.150
The values and comparisons in Table 4 show considerable discrepancy between the actual
values and the values implied by the logit model pre-entry, confirming that as expected, the
logit model and its implementation is not a very good representation of consumer preferences
and competition in wireless services in Canada. Its inaccuracies pre-entry cast considerable
doubt on its ability to accurately forecast the effect of a fourth national entrant.
149 For instance, access to the ARPU by carrier by province numbers and the number of subscribers might allow some
assessment on the validity of the assumption made by the Brattle Group to derive provincial ARPU by carrier. Recall
that the Brattle Group in deriving carrier ARPUs by province assumes that the ratio of two carriers’ ARPU by
province is the same as the ratio nationally. The comparison of the logit model with actuals suggests this might not
be the case. If the number of subscribers in the logit model is less than actuals then the variable profit difference —
approximately $2 billion higher in the logit model — must be attributable to a higher margin. While marginal costs
are less in the calibrated logit model, the variable profit difference might be sufficient to suggest that the prices
assumed to calibrate the logit model provincially are incorrect. 
150 The Brattle Group has not provided information on the common brand value for any of the providers, including the
fourth entrant.
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TABLE 4: BRATTLE GROUP’S IMPLIED MODEL VALUES VS. OBSERVED VALUES
Sources: Source notes for Table 4 in Appendix A.
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Population [1] 3,923,160 4,558,597 1,254,320 756,560 527,619 944,403 13,457,345 145,250 8,107,419 1,094,350 34,769,023
Total Subscribers (Observed) [2] 3,844,697 3,678,332 914,525 533,299 390,649 707,830 10,784,716 104,333 5,377,651 856,329 27,192,361
Market Size (Model) [3] 4,746,540 4,904,443 1,288,063 761,856 574,484 996,944 14,978,772 149,047 7,793,697 1,223,327 37,417,172
Market Size vs. Population [4] 21.0% 7.6% 2.7% 0.7% 8.9% 5.6% 11.3% 2.6% -3.9% 11.8% 7.6%
(% Difference)
Bell Marginal Cost (Model, $) [5] 32.32 33.43 31.58 21.08 9.36 21.23 29.86 21.87 29.17 29.44 28.66
Bell Marginal Cost (Observed, $) [6] - - - - - - - - - - 32.39
Bell Marginal Cost (% Difference) [7] - - - - - - - - - - -11.5%
Rogers Marginal Cost (Model, $) [8] 36.49 31.50 29.31 34.26 35.75 35.42 28.77 34.64 33.21 33.45 30.92
Rogers Marginal Cost  [9] - - - - - - - - - - 32.19
(Observed, $)
Rogers Marginal Cost [10] - - - - - - - - - - -3.9%
(% Difference)
Telus Marginal Cost  [11] 23.36 31.10 34.39 33.48 31.03 32.53 35.65 32.61 33.33 33.18 31.02
(Model, $)
Telus Marginal Cost  [12] - - - - - - - - - - 31.91
(Observed, $)
Telus Marginal Cost [13] - - - - - - - - - - -2.8%
(% Difference)
Big Three Variable Profit [14] 2,033.16 1,389.24 144.48 184.92 208.08 272.64 3,893.52 33.00 1,263.24 88.20 9,510.48 
(Model, $millions)
Big Three Variable Profit [15] - - - - - - - - - - 7,636
(Observed, $millions)
Big Three Variable Profit [16] - - - - - - - - - - 24.5%
(% Difference, Model/Observed)
Big Three Variable Profit [17] - - - - - - - - - - 7,742
(Alternate, $millions)































































CO-ORDINATED EXERCISE OF MARKET POWER
The Competition Bureau also asserts that there is a risk of co-ordinated pricing in wireless
services in Canada. That is, the Competition Bureau suggests that conditions in wireless
service markets are such that the three large carriers may not only recognize the advantages of
co-ordinating price increases, but also may be able to do so. The Competition Bureau asserts
that “Canadian mobile wireless markets are characterized by other factors that, when combined
with high concentration and very high barriers to entry and expansion, create a risk of co-
ordinated interaction in these markets.”151 The Competition Bureau explains that the relevant
factors include the availability of “information regarding prices, rival firms, and market
conditions” and “the existence of joint ventures and industry organizations that could facilitate
the communication and dissemination of information” (emphasis added).152 While it is well
known that public information about prices often facilitates co-ordination, that symmetrical
information regarding rivals and market conditions can make co-ordination easier, and that
joint ventures and trade associations might facilitate co-ordination, the Competition Bureau’s
statements without an analysis that they do lead to co-ordination in wireless services in Canada
amounts to mere possibility, and does not provide a foundation for policy intervention. 
There are a number of other characteristics that more convincingly suggest that co-ordination
in wireless services is difficult. These include product differentiation, non-price competition,
the presence of regional firms, asymmetrical capabilities to bundle, and market-share
asymmetries.153,154
The actual conduct of the three large wireless firms provides compelling evidence that co-
ordination is not an issue. The extent of active rivalry between the three national incumbent
wireless providers — reflected in investment levels, product innovation, pricing, and
advertising — is clearly inconsistent with co-ordinated conduct.155 The extent of this rivalry is
reflected in Figure 1. It shows the share of incumbent net additions by incumbent (which
includes both new wireless subscribers, as well as subscribers switching from other providers).
The share of net additions for each of the three major carriers varies substantially over time.
This is consistent with rivalry and not with the relatively stable shares that would be consistent
with co-ordination. Figure 2 confirms the lack of relatively stable market shares. It shows the
share, by incumbent, of the total number of incumbent subscribers.
151 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2013-685 Submission, para. 9, footnote omitted. Commissioner of
Competition, CRTC 2014-76 Submission, para. 28.
152 Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2013-685 Submission, footnote 13. See also Commissioner of Competition,
CRTC 2014-76 Submission, footnote 14.
153 See: Church and Ware, Industrial Organization, Section 10.1.3 for factors that make agreement on co-ordination
difficult, and Section 10.5 for factors that make sustaining co-ordination difficult.
154 Wi-Fi connections may be a viable alternative to data consumption on networks using licenced spectrum. This is
more likely the case for nomadic users, who need connectivity upon arriving at a variety of locations, rather than
truly mobile users, who require connectivity while on the move. As pointed out by a referee, the presence of a strong
substitute makes co-ordination difficult.
155 Prices in competitive markets are typically the same and move together. The observation that firms have similar
prices and that price changes are similar is consistent with competition, oligopoly, and co-ordination. To establish the
co-ordinated exercise of market power — co-ordination — requires evidence on the level of prices. In particular it
requires evidence that prices are higher than at the competitive level.
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FIGURE 1: SHARE OF INCUMBENT NET SUBSCRIBER ADDITIONS BY INCUMBENT
Source: G. Campbell, “Global Wireless Matrix 2Q2014,” Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 
21 July 2014; and G. Campbell, “Global Wireless Matrix 4Q07,” Merrill Lynch, 21 April 2008.
FIGURE 2: SHARE OF TOTAL INCUMBENT SUBSCRIBERS BY INCUMBENT 
Source: G. Campbell, “Global Wireless Matrix 2Q2014,” Bank of America Merrill Lynch,, 
21 July 2014 and G. Campbell, “Global Wireless Matrix 4Q07,” Merrill Lynch, 21 April 2008.
Non-price rivalry between the three incumbent firms underscores the extent of competition and
the absence of co-ordinated conduct. Canada has been a leader in HSPA+ and LTE rollouts and
compares favourably to its international peers in terms of wireless investment, with a high
level of capital intensity (the ratio of capital expenditures to revenues) and the highest level of
capital expenditures per subscriber among its peers in 2012.156 There is also considerable
competition over customer service. In 2012-2013, Telus had a far smaller share of complaints
to the Commissioner for Complaints for Telecommunications Services (CCTS) than did Bell or
Rogers and, relative to 2011-2012, Telus’ absolute number of complaints actually fell, whereas
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those for Bell and Rogers increased.157 Canadian telecommunications companies also spend
heavily on advertising: Rogers and Bell are two of the largest advertisers in the country.158
Adjusting for operating revenues, Rogers and Bell’s advertising expenditures appear to be
relatively intensive compared to other sectors.159 And, of course, the analysis of Rogers’
profitability suggests the absence of both the unilateral and co-ordinated exercise of market
power. 
The evidence is consistent with the absence of substantial inefficient market power, whether
unilateral or co-ordinated.
157 Including sub-brands, Telus accounted for approximately eight per cent of total CCTS complaints, whereas Bell and
Rogers accounted for 31 per cent and 35 per cent respectively over the period 2012-2013. The CCTS does not break
out wireline versus wireless complaints by telecommunications service provider. However, for 2012-2013,
approximately 60 per cent of all issues were related to wireless services. Assuming this ratio holds for complaints
and is similar across the three incumbent carriers, the number of complaints per million wireless subscribers in 2012-
2013 was 322.7 for Bell, 306.2 for Rogers, and only 83.8 for Telus. See: Commission for Complaints for
Telecommunications Services, CCTS Annual Report 2012-13, p. 37 and pp. 44-50; and Commission for Complaints
for Telecommunications Services, CCTS Annual Report 2011-12, pp. 40-45. Available online at 
http://www.ccts-cprst.ca/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/en/2012-2013/CCTS-Annual-Report-2012-2013.pdf and
http://www.ccts-cprst.ca/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/en/2011-2012/CCTS-Annual-Report-2011-2012.pdf. For more on
the strategic importance of customer service at Telus — and the scramble by Rogers and Bell to catch up — see: R.
Trichur, “Why Canada’s wireless industry may have finally shifted in the customer’s favour” The Globe and Mail 5
February 2014, online at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/why-canadas-wireless-industry-may-
have-finally-shifted-in-the-customers-favour/article16721659/.
158 In 2012, Rogers Communications and Bell Canada were the second- and fourth-largest advertisers in Canada with
advertising expenditures of $145 million and $90 million respectively. C. Powell, “GroupM Adjusts Expectations for
Global, Canadian Ad Spending,” Marketing Magazine, 14 August 2013. Available online at
http://www.marketingmag.ca/news/media-news/groupm-adjusts-expectations-for-global-canadian-ad-spending-85770. 
159 For 2012, Bell and Rogers’ advertising as a share of operating revenues is estimated at 0.79 per cent. See: Powell,
“GroupM Adjusts” and BCE and Rogers’ 2012 Company Annual Reports. The advertising sector represented 0.39
per cent of Canadian GDP. See: “Service bulletin: Advertising and Related Services 2012,” Statistics Canada, online
at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/63-257-x/63-257-x2014001-eng.htm; and “Gross domestic product, expenditure-
based,” Statistics Canada, online at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/econ04-eng.htm. In
2012, three of the other top 10 advertisers in Canada were the Big Three domestic automobile manufacturers. The
share of advertising in revenues for the automotive sector, based on GroupM’s estimate of total automotive
advertising of $1.03 billion, and StatsCan’s estimate of total retail sales for new motor vehicles of $85.10 billion, is




The conclusions from our initial study continue to have broad applicability to prospective
policy interventions that aim to create more competition by subsidizing entry. The key issue is
whether the evidence supports a robust finding of a substantial inefficient market power.
Without such a finding, there are no grounds for policy intervention. As an example, without
evidence consistent with the exercise of inefficient market power in wireless services, the
Competition Bureau’s assertions that high roaming rates have raised the costs of entrants and
resulted in a substantial lessening of competition are irrelevant. Similarly, the Competition
Bureau’s argument that new entrants would have been more successful but for the high
roaming rates charged by incumbents, depends upon a finding of market power.160
Moreover, using wholesale roaming rates as a mechanism to subsidize what would otherwise
be unviable entry may have unintended consequences. If competition is artificially sustained,
firms may find their margins squeezed such that they do not earn sufficient quasi-rents to
recover their investments. As we argued in our analysis:161
Understanding that quasi-rents are absolutely essential to the functioning of a
market economy, and not artificially imperiling their existence, is important to
reducing the risk of, and hence providing incentives for, investment. A government
should not change its policies to undermine quasi-rents based on an incomplete and
incorrect market-power analysis, itself based on the magnitude of those quasi-rents
or the high gross margins from which they stem. To promote investment, and ensure
prosperity, responsible governments try very hard to avoid expropriating the returns
from sunk investments and thereby minimize policy and regulatory risk of
investment.
One wonders how long the federal government and its agencies will continue the failed policy
of attempting to “enhance competition” in wireless markets beyond its natural limit and what
the final cost to Canadians of an economically vacuous commitment to the proposition that
competition is measured by the number of competitors. 
160 The Competition Bureau cites the Federal Court of Appeal ruling on Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v.
Canada Pipe Company Ltd., in support of its “but for” argument. See: “Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2013-
685, Wholesale mobile wireless roaming in Canada — Unjust discrimination/undue preference — Reply of the
Commissioner of Competition,” February 10, 2014, Comments at footnote 22,
https://services.crtc.gc.ca/pub/DocWebBroker/OpenDocument.aspx?DMID=2073547. 
The Federal Court of Appeal found that a “but for” analysis was required to determine the effect of the alleged anti-
competitive conduct on market power. But this is only sensible if the firm whose conduct is at issue has market
power. In Canada Pipe the tribunal did find that Canada Pipe was dominant (i.e., had market power), a finding
upheld on appeal by the Federal Court of Appeal. See: Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Canada Pipe
Company Ltd., 2006 FCA 233 at para. 59, http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2007/2006fca233.html; and, more generally:
Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Company Ltd., 2006 FCA 236, 
http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/32926/index.do.
161 Church and Wilkins, Wireless Competition, p. 27.
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APPENDIX A
Sources – Table 4:
[1]: Population values are from Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, Table 12. Note that the Canada value is the sum of
the values for the ten provinces.
[2]: Total observed subscriber values are from Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, Table 13. Note that the Canada value
is the sum of the ten provinces. It appears that the Brattle Group calculated these values by multiplying their
population values by both the wireless penetration and wireless coverage rates from CRTC, Communications
Monitoring Report 2013, Table 5.5.10. It is unclear why wireless coverage rates should be included in this
calculation (as population multiplied simply by penetration rate yields the number of subscribers), however given the
high wireless coverage rate in Canada, including this rate does not greatly impact the resulting subscriber value.
By multiplying these total observed subscriber values for each province with provincial firm share data (presented
below) we calculate provincial observed subscriber values for Bell, Rogers and Telus. As above, the Canada total is
the sum of the 10 provinces. The “Big Three” total is the sum of the Bell, Rogers and Telus values.
Provincial level subscriber shares for Bell, Rogers, and Telus (from Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, Table 1):
Corresponding observed subscriber values for Bell, Rogers and Telus:
[3]: Model market size is calculated by dividing the observed number of subscribers in [2] by the inside market share,
calculated below as 100 per cent less the outside market share, from Commissioner of Competition, CRTC 2014-
76 Response to Interrogatories, Table Bell-Q28.
The Canada value for model market size is calculated as the sum of the ten provinces.
[4]: ([3]-[1])÷[1]×100%
Model market size vs. population % difference is calculated by dividing the difference between the model market
size and population by population.
[5], [8], and [11]: Provincial model marginal cost values for Bell, Rogers, and Telus from Commissioner of Competition,
CRTC 2014-76 Response to Interrogatories, Table Bell-Q29. The Canada marginal cost values are calculated by
weighting these provincial model marginal cost values using the respective firm subscriber values found in the
source notes for [2].
[6], [9], and [12]: Observed marginal cost values (variable cost values) for Canada for Bell, Rogers, and Telus from
Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, Table B-1.
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Bell Subscriber Share (%) 23 18 5 58 73 55 28 58 33 10
Rogers Subscriber Share (%) 24 39 33 19 2 16 44 15 29 9



























































Bell Observed 884,280 662,100 45,726 309,313 285,174 389,307 3,019,720 60,513 1,774,625 85,633 7,516,391
Subscribers
Rogers Observed 922,727 1,434,549 301,793 101,327 7,813 113,253 4,745,275 15,650 1,559,519 77,070 9,278,976
Subscribers
Telus Observed 1,922,349 1,471,333 82,307 122,659 97,662 205,271 2,156,943 28,170 1,505,742 85,633 7,678,069
Subscribers































































Model Outside Share (%) 19 25 29 30 32 29 28 30 31 30
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Marginal cost % difference values for Bell, Rogers, and Telus are calculated by dividing the difference of the model
marginal cost less the observed marginal cost for each firm by the observed marginal cost for each firm. 
[14]: Big Three model variable profit values are from Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless, Table B-3.
[15]: ($2,115 million)+($3,063 million)+($2,458 million) = $7,636 million
Observed Big Three variable profit values are the sum of reported values (for 2012) from the Big Three annual
reports. 2013 BCE Annual Report, p. 47 (wireless EBITDA=$2,115 million). Available online at
http://www.bce.ca/assets/investors/AR_2013/BCE_2013_Annual_Report.pdf. 2013 Rogers Annual Report, p. 39
(wireless adjusted operating profit=$3,063 million). Available online at
https://www.rogers.com/cms/investors/pdf/annual-reports/2013_Annual-Report.pdf. 2013 Telus Annual Report, p.
40 (wireless EBITDA=$2,458 million). Available online at
http://about.telus.com/investors/annualreport2013/files/pdf/en/ar.pdf.
[16]: ([14]-[15])/[15]×100%
Big Three variable profit (model/observed) % difference is calculated by dividing the difference of the model Big
Three variable profit less the observed Big Three variable profit by the observed Big Three variable profit.
[17]: Alternative Big Three Variable Profits = ($23.66/month/Bell subscriber)×(12 months)×(7,516,391 Bell 
subscribers)
+ ($27.46/month/Rogers subscriber)×(12 months)×(9,278,976 Rogers 
subscribers)
+ ($27.68/month/Telus subscriber)×(12 months)×(7,678,069 Telus 
subscribers)
= $7.742 million
Bell, Rogers and Telus variable profit values (in $/month/subscriber) are from Brattle Group, Canadian Wireless,
Table B-1.
Bell, Rogers and Telus subscriber values are the observed subscriber values calculated in the source notes for [2].
[18]: ([14]-[18])/[18]×100%
Big Three variable profit (model/alternate) % difference is calculated by dividing the difference of the model Big Three
variable profit less the alternative Big Three variable profit by the alternative Big Three variable profit.
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